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Summary
Operation Iraqi Freedom accomplished a long-standing objective, the overthrow
and capture of Saddam Hussein, but replacing that regime with a stable, moderate,
democratic political structure has run into difficulty. Past U.S. efforts to change the
regime failed because of limited U.S. commitment, disorganization of the Iraqi
opposition, and the efficiency and ruthlessness of Iraq’s several overlapping security
services. Previous U.S. Administrations had ruled out major U.S. military action to
change Iraq’s regime, believing such action would be risky and not necessarily
justified by the level of Iraq’s lack of compliance on WMD disarmament.
In his 2002 and 2003 State of the Union messages, President Bush characterized
Iraq as a grave potential threat to the United States because of its refusal to verifiably
abandon its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and the potential for it
to transfer WMD to terrorist groups. In September 2002, the President told the U.N.
General Assembly that unless Iraq fullydisarmed in cooperation with United Nations
weapons inspectors, the United States would lead a coalition to achieve that
disarmament militarily, making clear that this would include the ouster of Iraq’s
President Saddam Hussein’s regime. After a November 2002 - March 2003 round
of U.N. inspections in which Iraq’s cooperation was mixed, on March 19, 2003 the
United States launched Operation Iraqi Freedom to disarm Iraq and change its
regime. The regime fell on April 9, 2003.
In the months prior to the war, the Administration stressed that regime change
through U.S.-led military action would yield benefits beyond disarmament and
reduction of support for terrorism; benefits such as liberation of the Iraqi people
from an oppressive regime and promotion of stability and democracy throughout the
Middle East. However, escalating resistance to the U.S.-led occupation has
contributed to Administration implementation of several options, including attempts
to recruit more foreign participation to post-war peacekeeping, building Iraqi
institutions that can maintain security, and, as of November 2003, accelerating
transfer of authority to Iraqi political bodies. Formerlyexiled opposition groups form
the core of a U.S.-appointed 25-seat “governing council” as well as a 25-person
cabinet; these bodies are relatively representative of Iraq’s ethnic and political
factions but not viewed widely within Iraq as effective or legitimate institutions.
Congress has passed legislation (H.R. 3289, P.L. 108-106) that provides
supplemental FY2004 funding for military costs and reconstruction in Iraq (and
Afghanistan).
See also CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Recent Developments in Reconstruction
Assistance, and CRS Report RL32090, FY2004 Supplemental Appropriations for
Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Global War on Terrorism: Military Operations &
Reconstruction Assistance. This report will be updated as warranted by major
developments.
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Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts
and Post-Saddam Governance
The United States did remove Iraq’s Saddam Hussein from power in the course
of the 1991 Persian Gulf war, and his regime, contrary to U.S. expectations, survived
post-war uprisings by Iraq’s Shiites and Kurds. Subsequently, the United States
sought to remove Saddam from power by supporting dissidents inside Iraq, although
changing Iraq’s regime was not declared policy until 1998. In November 1998, amid
a crisis with Iraq over U.N. weapons of mass destruction (WMD) inspections, the
Clinton Administration stated that the United States would seek to go beyond
containment to promoting a change of regime. A regime change policy was endorsed
by the Iraq Liberation Act (P.L. 105-338, October 31, 1998). Bush Administration
officials emphasized regime change as the cornerstone of U.S. policy toward Iraq
since shortly after the September 11, 2001, attacks. Operation Iraqi Freedom was
launched on March 19, 2003, and had effectively removed Saddam Hussein from
power by April 9, 2003. Saddam Hussein was captured alive on December 13, 2003.
The Bush Administration’s stated goal is to transform Iraq into a democracy
that could be a model for the rest of the region. Iraq has not had experience with a
democratic form of government, although parliamentary elections were held during
the period of British rule under a League of Nations mandate (1920-1932). Iraq,
which became independent in 1932, was governed by kings from the Hashemite
dynastyduring 1921-1958, although with substantial British direction and influence.1
Members of the Hashemite dynasty continue to rule in neighboring Jordan. Iraq’s
first Hashemite king was Faysal bin Hussein, son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca, who
led the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire. Faysal ruled Iraq as King Faysal I
and was succeeded by his son, Ghazi (1933-1939). Ghazi was succeeded by his son,
Faysal II, who ruled until the military coup of Abd al-Karim al-Qasim in 1958. He
was ousted in February 1963 by an alliance of the Baath Party and military officers.
One of the Baath Party’s allies in the February 1963 coup was Abd al-Salam al-
Arif. In November 1963, Arif purged the Baath, including Baathist Prime Minister
Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, and instituted direct military rule. Arif was killed in a
helicopter crash in 1966 and was replaced by his elder brother, Abd al-Rahim al-Arif,
who ruled until the Baath Party coup of July 1968. Following the Baath seizure,
Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, a military figure, returned to government as President of Iraq
and Saddam Hussein, a civilian, became the second most powerful leader as Vice
Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council. In that position, Saddam
developed and oversaw a system of overlapping security services to monitor loyalty
among the population and within Iraq’s institutions, including the military. On July
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2 Sciolino, Elaine. “Greater U.S. Effort Backed To Oust Iraqi.” New York Times, June 2,
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17, 1979, the aging al-Bakr resigned at Saddam’s urging, and Saddam became
President of Iraq.
Past Attempts to Oust Saddam
Prior to the launching on January 16, 1991 of Operation Desert Storm, an
operation that reversed Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, President George
H.W. Bush called on the Iraqi people to overthrow Saddam. Within days of the end
of the Gulf war (February 28, 1991), opposition Shiite Muslims in southern Iraq and
Kurdish factions in northern Iraq, emboldened by the regime’s defeat and the hope
of U.S. support, launched significant rebellions. The revolt in southern Iraq reached
the suburbs of Baghdad, but the Republican Guard forces, composed mainly of
regime loyalists, had survived the war largely intact, having been withdrawn from
battle prior to the U.S. ground offensive, and it defeated the Shiite rebels by mid-
March 1991. ManyShiites blamed the United States for not supporting their uprising
and standing aside as the regime retaliated against those who participated in the
rebellion. Kurds, benefitting from a U.S.-led “no fly zone” established in April 1991,
drove Iraqi troops out of much of northern Iraq and subsequently remained free of
Baghdad’s rule.
According to press reports, about two months after the failure of the Shiite
uprising, President George H.W. Bush forwarded to Congress an intelligence finding
stating that the United States would undertake efforts to promote a military coup
against Saddam Hussein; a reported $15 million to $20 million was allocated for that
purpose. The Administration apparently believed — and this view apparently was
shared by many experts and U.S. officials — that a coup by elements within the
current regime could produce a favorable new government without fragmenting Iraq.
Manyobservers, however, including neighboring governments, feared that Shiite and
Kurdish groups, if they ousted Saddam, would divide Iraq into warring ethnic and
tribal groups, opening Iraq to influence from neighboring Iran, Turkey, and Syria.
Emergence of An Anti-Saddam Coalition
Reports in July 1992 of a serious but unsuccessful coup attempt suggested that
the U.S. strategy might ultimately succeed. However, there was disappointment
within the George H.W. Bush Administration that the coup had failed and a decision
was made to shift the U.S. approach from promotion of a coup to supporting the
diverse opposition groups that had led the post-war rebellions. At the same time, the
Kurdish, Shiite, and other opposition elements were coalescing into a broad and
diverse movement that appeared to be gaining support internationally. This
opposition coalition was seen as providing a vehicle for the United States to build a
viable overthrow strategy. Congress more than doubled the budget for covert
support to the opposition groups to about $40 million for FY1993.2
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The Iraqi National Congress/Ahmad Chalabi
The growing opposition coalition took shape in an organization called the Iraqi
National Congress (INC). The INC was formally constituted when the two main
Kurdish militias, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK), participated in a June 1992 meeting in Vienna of dozens of
opposition groups. In October 1992, major Shiite Islamist groups came into the
coalition when the INC met in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq.
The INC appeared viable because it brought under one banner varying Iraqi
ethnic groups and diverse political ideologies, including nationalists, ex-military
officers, and defectors from Iraq’s ruling Baath Party. The Kurds provided the INC
with a source of armed force and a presence on Iraqi territory. Its constituent groups
publicly united around a platform that appeared to match U.S. values and interests,
including human rights, democracy, pluralism, “federalism” (see below), the
preservation of Iraq’s territorial integrity, and compliance with U.N. Security
Council resolutions on Iraq.3 However, many observers doubted its commitment to
democracy, because most of its groups have an authoritarian internal structure, and
because of inherent tensions among its varied ethnic groups and ideologies. The
INC’s first Executive Committee consisted of KDP leader Masud Barzani, ex-Baath
Party and military official Hassan Naqib, and moderate Shiite cleric Mohammad
Bahr al-Ulum. (Barzani and Bahr al-Ulum are now on the 25-member post-war
Governing Council and both are part of its nine member rotating presidency.)
Ahmad Chalabi. When the INC was formed, its Executive Committee
selected Ahmad Chalabi, who is about 59 years old and is a secular Shiite Muslim
from a prominent banking family, to run the INC on a daily basis. Chalabi was
educated in the United States (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MIT) as a
mathematician. He fled Iraq to Jordan in 1958, when the Hashemite monarchy was
overthrown in a military coup. This coup occurred 10 years before the Baath Party
took power in Iraq (July 1968). In 1978, he founded the Petra Bank in Jordan but
later ran afoul of Jordanian authorities on charges of embezzlement and he left
Jordan, possibly with some help from members of Jordan’s royal family, in 1989.
In 1992, he was convicted in absentia of embezzling $70 million from the bank and
sentenced to 22 years in prison. The Jordanian government subsequently repaid
depositors a total of $400 million. Chalabi maintains that the Jordanian government
was pressured by Iraq to turn against him, and he asserts that he has since rebuilt ties
to the Jordanian government. In April 2003, senior Jordanian officials, including
King Abdullah, called Chalabi “divisive” and stopped just short of saying he would
be unacceptable to Jordan as leader of Iraq. Chalabi’s critics acknowledge that,
despite allegations about his methods, he was single-minded in his determination to
overthrow Saddam Hussein, and he is said to be favored by those Administration
officials, particularly in the Department of Defense, who most supported changing
Iraq’s regime by force.
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Since Chalabi returned to Iraq, there have been no large public demonstrations
supportive of him or the INC, indicating that he might not have a large following
inside Iraq. However, anecdotal press reporting suggest that he has attracted some
support from those Iraqis that most welcomed the U.S. military offensive against Iraq
and subsequent occupation. On April 6, Chalabi and about 700 INC fighters (“Free
Iraqi Forces”) were airlifted by the U.S. military from their base in the north to the
Nasiriya area, purportedly to help stabilize civil affairs in southern Iraq, later
deploying to Baghdad and other parts of Iraq. After establishing his headquarters in
Baghdad, Chalabi tried to build support by searching for fugitive members of the
former regime and arranging for U.S. military forces in Iraq to provide security or
other benefits to his potential supporters. However, the Free Iraqi Forces
accompanying Chalabi were disbanded following the U.S. decision in mid-May2003
to disarm independent militias.
Chalabi is part of a grouping of five leaders of major exile parties that held a
series of planning meetings shortly prior to the 2003 war. The major-party grouping
was hoping to become the core of a successor regime, and the major parties are
represented on the Governing Council. Chalabi is a member of the Governing
Council and one of the nine that will rotate its presidency. He was president of the
Council during the month of September 2003 and represented Iraq at the U.N.
General Assembly meetings that month.
A prominent INC intellectual is Kanaan Makiya, who wrote a 1989 book,
Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq, detailing alleged Iraqi regime human
rights abuses. Makiya supports a Western-style democracy for Iraq, including full
rights for women and Iraq’s minorities. A self-described atheist, he taught Middle
Eastern politics at Brandeis University prior to returning to Iraq after the fall of
Saddam. In August 2003, Makiya was tapped by the Governing Council to head a
25-person committee that was to propose a process for drafting a new constitution
(see below).
On November 23, 2003, the Governing Council announced the appointment of
a pro-INC Iraqi-American woman, Rend Rahim Francke, as representative of Iraq to
the United States. Since the 1991 Gulf war, she headed an opposition group called
the Iraq Foundation, which has an office in Washington and received some U.S.
democratization funds since the early 1990s. She is working out of Bahrain’s
embassy in Washington, at least temporarily.
The Kurds/KDP and PUK. The Kurds, among the most pro-U.S. of all the
groups in Iraq, do not have ambitions to play a major role in governing Arab Iraq, but
Iraq’s neighbors have always been fearful that the Kurds might still seek outright
independence. In committing to the concept of federalism, the INC platform
assured the Kurds substantial autonomy within a post-Saddam Iraq. Turkey, which
has a sizable Kurdish population in the areas bordering northern Iraq, particularly
fears that independence for Iraq’s Kurds would likely touch off an effort to unify into
a broader “Kurdistan.” Iraq’s Kurds have been fighting intermittently for autonomy
since their region was incorporated into the newly formed Iraqi state after World War
I. In 1961, the KDP, then led by founder Mullah Mustafa Barzani, current KDP
leader Masud Barzani’s father, began an insurgency that has continued until today,
although interrupted by periods of autonomy negotiations with Baghdad. Masud
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Barzani’s brother, Idris, commanded Kurdish forces against Iraq during the Iran-Iraq
war but was killed in that war. The PUK, headed by Jalal Talabani, split off from
the KDP in 1965; the PUK’s members are generally more well-educated, urbane, and
left-leaning than those of the KDP. Together, the PUK and KDP have about 40,000-
60,000 fighters, some of which are trained in conventional military tactics.
In the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf war, the KDP and the PUK agreed in May
1992 to share power after parliamentary and executive elections. In May 1994,
tensions between them flared into clashes, and the KDP turned to Baghdad for
backing. In August 1996, Iraqi forces helped the KDP capture Irbil, seat of the
Kurdish regional government; Iraqi forces acted at the KDP’s invitation. With U.S.
mediation, the Kurdish parties agreed on October 23, 1996, to a cease-fire and the
establishment of a 400-man peace monitoring force composed mainly of Turkomens
(75% of the force). The United States funded the force with FY1997 funds of $3
million for peacekeeping (Section 451 of the Foreign Assistance Act), plus about
$4 million in DOD drawdowns for vehicles and communications gear (Section 552
of the FAA). Also set up was a peace supervisory group consisting of the United
States, Britain, Turkey, the PUK, the KDP, and Iraqi Turkomens.
A tenuous cease-fire held after November 1997, and the KDP and PUK leaders
signed an agreement in Washington in September 1998 to work toward resolving the
main outstanding issues (sharing of revenues and control over the Kurdish regional
government). Reconciliation efforts showed substantial progress in 2002 as the
Kurds perceived that the United States might act to overthrow the regime of Saddam
Hussein. On October 4, 2002, the two Kurdish factions jointly reconvened the
Kurdish regional parliament for the first time since their 1994 clashes. In June 2002,
the United States gave the Kurds $3.1 million in new assistance to further the
reconciliation process.
In post-Saddam Iraq, both Barzani and Talabani were part of the major-party
grouping that has now been incorporated into the Governing Council, and both are
part of the Council’s rotating presidency. Talabani was Council president during
November 2003. The KDP and PUK are said to be increasingly combining their
political resources and efforts to re-establish the joint governance of the Kurdish
regions that was in place during 1992-1994. The Kurdish parties are also negotiating
with U.S. authorities to maintain substantial autonomy in northern Iraq in a
sovereign, post-occupation Iraq, although clashes have flared in December 2003-
January 2004 between Arabs and Kurds in the city of Kirkuk as Kurdish leaders
have sought to politically incorporate that city into the Kurdish regions.
Ansar al-Islam/Al Qaeda/Zarqawi. In the mid-1990s, the two main
Kurdish parties enjoyed good relations with a small Kurdish Islamic faction, the
Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK), which is headed by Shaikh Ali Abd-al
Aziz. Based in Halabja, Iraq, the IMIK publicized the effects of Baghdad’s March
1988 chemical attack on that city, and it allied with the PUK in 1998.
A radical faction of the IMIK split off in 1998, calling itself the Jund al-Islam
(Army of Islam). It later changed its name to Ansar al-Islam (Partisans of Islam).
This Ansar faction was led by Mullah Krekar, an Islamist Kurd who reportedly had
once studied under Shaikh Abdullah al-Azzam, an Islamic theologian of Palestinian
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origin who was the spiritual mentor of Osama bin Laden. Ansar reportedly
associated itself with Al Qaeda and agreed to host in its northern Iraq enclave Al
Qaeda fighters, mostly of Arab origin, who had fled the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan
in 2001. Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, during which its base was captured,
about 600 primarily Arab fighters lived in the Ansar al-Islam enclave, near the town
of Khurmal.4 Ansar fighters clashed with the PUK around Halabja in December
2002, and Ansar gunmen were allegedly responsible for an assassination attempt
against PUK prime minister Barham Salih in April 2002. Possibly because his Ansar
movement was largely taken over by the Arab fighters from Afghanistan, Krekar left
northern Iraq for northern Europe. He was detained in Norway in August 2002 and
was arrested again in early January 2004.
The leader of the Arab contingent within Ansar al-Islam is said by U.S. officials
to be Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, an Arab of Jordanian origin who reputedly fought in
Afghanistan. Zarqawi has been linked to Al Qaeda plots in Jordan during the
December 1999 millennium celebration, the assassination in Jordan of U.S. diplomat
Lawrence Foley (2002), and to reported attempts in 2002 to spread the biological
agent ricin in London and possibly other places in Europe. In a presentation to the
U.N. Security Council on February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Powell tied Zarqawi
and Ansar to Saddam Hussein’s regime, which might have viewed Ansar al-Islam as
a means of pressuring Baghdad’s Kurdish opponents. Although Zarqawi reportedly
received medical treatment in Baghdad in May 2002 after fleeing Afghanistan, many
experts believed Baghdad-Ansar links were tenuous or even non-existent; Baghdad
did not control northern Iraq even before Operation Iraqi Freedom.5 Zarqawi’s
current whereabouts are unknown, although some unconfirmed press reports indicate
he might have fled to Iran after the fall of the Ansar camp to U.S.-led forces. Some
recent press accounts say Iran might have him in custody.6 U.S. officials have said
since August 2003 that some Ansar fighters, possibly at the direction of Zarqawi,
might have remained in or re-entered Iraq and are participating in the resistance to
the U.S. occupation, possibly including organizing acts of terrorism such as recent
car/truck bombings (see below). One press report quotes U.S. intelligence as
assessing the number of Ansar fighters inside Iraq at 150.7 Ansar al-Islam is not
listed by the State Department as Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).
Shiite Islamist Organizations
Some U.S. officials and outside experts have had concerns about the potential
strength and ideological orientation of Iraq’s Shiite Islamic fundamentalist groups
in post-Saddam Iraq. Many perceive these factions as aligned with Iran. Others
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believe that Iraq’s Shiite clerics consult with but do not answer to Iran and do not
seek to model a post-war Iraqi state after Iran’s Islamic republic. The United States
sought to work with some Shiite Islamist opposition factions during the 1990s but
had few if any contacts with others. Shiite Islamist factions hold at least five seats
on the Governing Council unveiled July 13, 2003.
SCIRI/Badr Corps. The most well known among these Shiite factions is the
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), which was a member
of the INC in the early and mid-1990s but progressively distanced itself from the INC
banner. SCIRI was set up in 1982 to increase Iranian control over Shiite opposition
groups in Iraq and the Persian Gulf states. SCIRI’s leader, Ayatollah Muhammad
Baqr al-Hakim, died in a car bomb by unknown assailants in Najaf on August 29,
2003.
Mohammad Baqr Al Hakim was the late Ayatollah Khomeini’s choice to head
an Islamic Republic of Iraq, a vision that, if realized, might conflict with U.S. plans
to forge a democratic Iraq. Baqr Al Hakim and his family fled Iraq to Iran in 1980,
during a major crackdown on Shiite activist groups by Saddam Hussein. Saddam
feared that Iraqi Shiite Islamists, inspired and emboldened by the Islamic revolution
in Iran in 1979, posed a major threat to his regime. Prior to the formation of SCIRI,
Hakim and his family were leaders of the Da’wa (Islamic Call) Party (see below).
Mohammed Baqr was the son of the late Ayatollah Muhsin Al Hakim, who was a
prominent Shiite leader in southern Iraq and an associate of Ayatollah Khomeini
when Khomeini was in exile in southern Iraq during 1964-1978. Baqr Al Hakim had
returned to Iraq on May 10, 2003, welcomed by crowds in Basra and Najaf.
Until August 2002, when Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim joined other opposition figures
for meetings in Washington, D.C., SCIRI had publicly refused to work openly with
the United States or accept U.S. assistance, although it was part of the INC and did
have contacts with the United States prior to the 2003 war effort. Unlike some other
Shiite Islamist groups, SCIRI has had good working relations with some Iraqi Sunni
Arab factions and most Kurdish parties.
In post-Saddam Iraq, SCIRI leaders have participated in U.S.-led efforts to
establish a post-war government and counseled their followers to tolerate, at least
temporarily, the U.S. occupation as a necessary vehicle for building an Iraq in which
Shiites are adequately represented. At the same time, SCIRI has called for the rapid
restoration of Iraqi sovereignty. After he returned to Iraq, Mohammed Baqr Al
Hakim had said he was for a democracy and would not seek to establish an Iranian-
style Islamic republic. Abd al-Aziz al Hakim met with other opposition leaders in
late April 2003 at a post-war governance planning session in Iraq, sponsored by U.S.
officials. Abd al-Aziz later helped constitute the major-party core of the Governing
Council, and he is part of the nine-person rotating Council presidency. (He will head
the Council during December 2003.) Nonetheless, U.S. officials are said to be
mistrustful of SCIRI’s goals and its ties to Iran.
In addition to its agents and activists in the Shiite areas of Iraq, SCIRI has about
10,000-15,000 fighters/activists organized into a “Badr Brigades” (named after a
major battle in early Islam) that, during the 1980s and 1990s, conducted forays from
Iran into southern Iraq to attack Baath Party officials there. The Badr Brigades are
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headed by Mohammed Baqr’s younger brother, Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, who returned
to Iraq on April 20, 2003, to pave the way for Mohammed Baqr’s return. Abd al-
Aziz has taken over the leadership of the movement in the wake of his elder
brother’s death on August 29. (Another Hakim brother, Mahdi, was killed in Sudan
in 1990, allegedly by agents of Iraq’s security services.) Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim’s key
aide is Adel Abd-al Mahdi.
Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, which is politically aligned with Iran’s hard line
civilian officials, has been the key patron of the Badr Brigades, providing it with
weapons, funds, and other assistance; the Brigades fought alongside the Guard
against Iraqi forces during the Iran-Iraq war. However, many Iraqi Shiites view
SCIRI as an Iranian creation and SCIRI/Badr Brigade operations in southern Iraq
prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom did not spark broad popular unrest against the Iraqi
regime. Some Badr fighters deployed inside northern Iraq on the eve of Operation
Iraqi Freedom, and the rest have since entered Iraq. Asserting that the United States
failed to create a secure environment that might have prevented the August 29, 2003,
bombing that killed Ayatollah Al Hakim, some Brigade fighters have deployed
throughout Najaf since the bombing.
A variety of press reports say that some other individual militias now providing
security in many towns in southern Iraq are linked to the Badr Brigades. One such
militia is derived from the fighters who challenged Saddam Hussein’s forces in the
marsh areas of southern Iraq, around the town of Amara, north of Basra. It goes by
the name Hizbollah (Party of God)-Amara, and it is headed by marsh guerrilla leader
Abdul Karim Muhammadawi, nicknamed “Prince of the Marshes” who was named
to the Governing Council. He is widely perceived as an ally of SCIRI and is
considered by observers to have substantial Shiite support north of Basra.
Da’wa Party. The Da’wa Party, Iraq’s oldest organized Shiite Islamist
grouping, continues to exist as a separate group, but many Da’wa activists appear to
be at least loosely allied with SCIRI. The party was founded in 1957 by a revered
Iraqi Shiite cleric, Ayatollah Mohammed Baqr Al Sadr, a like-minded associate of
Ayatollah Khomeini. It was the most active Shiite opposition movement in the few
years following Iran’s Islamic revolution in February 1979; Da’wa activists
conducted guerrilla attacks against the Baathist regime and attempted assassinations
of senior Iraqi leaders, including Tariq Aziz. Baqr Al Sadr and his sister were hung
by the Iraqi regime in 1980 for the unrest, and many other Da’wa activists were killed
or imprisoned. After the Iraqi crackdown, many surviving Da’wa leaders moved into
Iran; some subsequently joined SCIRI, but others rejected Iranian control of Iraq’s
Shiite opposition movement and continued to affiliate only with Da’wa.
In post-Saddam Iraq, Da’wa’s current leader, Ibrahim Jafari, and its leader in
Basra, Abd al Zahra Othman, are on the Governing Council, as is a former Da’wa
activist turned human rights activist, Muwaffaq Al-Ruba’i. Ruba’i is reputed to be
personally and politically close to Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani (see below). Jafari is one
of the nine members of the Council that is rotating the presidency; he was first to
hold that post-August 2003.)
The Kuwaiti branch of the Da’wa Party allegedly was responsible for a May
1985 attempted assassination of the Amir of Kuwait and the December 1983 attacks
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on the U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait. The Hizballah organization in Lebanon
was founded by Lebanese clerics loyal to Ayatollah Baqr Al Sadr and the late
Ayatollah Khomeini, and there continue to be personal and ideological linkages
between Hizballah and the Da’wa Party. The Hizballah activists who held U.S.
hostages in that country during the 1980s often attempted to link release of the
Americans to the release of 17 Da’wa Party prisoners held by Kuwait for those
attacks in the 1980s. Some Iraqi Da’wa members look to Lebanon’s senior Shiite
cleric Mohammed Hossein Fadlallah, who was a student and protege of Ayatollah
Mohammed Baqr Al Sadr, for spiritual guidance. These linkages could explain
reports that security personnel and other activists from Lebanese Hizballah have
entered Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein, although other explanations include
an effort by Iran to work through Lebanese Hizballah to build leverage in southern
Iraq.8
Sadr Movement/Moqtada Al Sadr.9 Members of the clan of the late
Ayatollah Mohammed Baqr Al Sadr have become highly active in post-Saddam Iraq.
The Sadr clan, based in Iraq during Saddam Hussein’s rule, was repressed and not
politically active during that time. The United States had no contact with this
grouping prior to the 2003 war and did not attempt to enlist it in any overthrow
efforts during 1991-2002. Although the Sadr clan has been closely identified with
the Da’wa Party (see above), it appears that members of the clan and their followers
currently are operating in post-war Iraq as a movement separate from Da’wa.
Another revered member of the clan, Mohammed Sadiq Al Sadr, and two of his sons,
were killed by Saddam’s security forces in 1999. A surviving son of Mohammad
Sadiq, Moqtada Al Sadr, who is about 30 years old, has attempted to rally his
followers to attain a prominent role in post-Saddam Shiite politics. He and his clan
apparently have a large following in the poorer Shiite neighborhoods of Baghdad,
which, after the fall of the regime on April 9, renamed their district “Sadr City,”
from the former name of “Saddam City.” However, Moqtada is viewed by many
Iraqi Shiites as a young radical who lacks religious and political weight. To
compensate for his lack of religious credentials, he has sought spiritual authority for
his actions from exiled Iraqi senior cleric, Ayatollah Kazem Haeri, who is living in
Qom, Iran. An alternate interpretation by some experts is that Haeri is acting at the
direction of Iran’s leadership to keep Moqtada Sadr under a measure of control.
Moqtada’s reputation was tarnished in early April 2003 when his supporters
allegedly killed Abd al-Majid Khoi, the son of the late Grand Ayatollah Abdol
Qasem Musavi-Khoi, shortly after his return to Najaf from exile in London. Abd al-
Majid Khoi headed the Khoi Foundation, based in London, and he returned to Iraq
after U.S.-led forces took Najaf. Grand Ayatollah Khoi differed with the political
doctrines of Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran.
The Sadr grouping is not represented in the Governing Council. Moqtada has
used his Friday prayer sermons in Kufa (near Najaf) and other forums to denounce
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the Council as a puppet of the U.S. occupation. In July 2003, Moqtada and his aides
began recruiting for an Islamic army, for now unarmed, that Sadr says must
challenge the U.S. occupation, although he has thus far stopped short of openly
calling for armed attacks on American forces. He is openly calling for a cleric-led
Islamic state similar to that of Iran. In August 2003, Shiites in Basra and in Baghdad
rioted against British and U.S. occupation forces over fuel shortages and perceived
slights, and there was speculation that Moqtada was helping fuel the riots. Several
days of anti-U.S. demonstrations by pro-Sadr Shiites broke out in Baghdad in early
October 2003. One report says that Sunni Islamists, led by Shaikh Ahmad Qubaysi,
who returned in April 2003 from exile in the UAE, is assisting the Sadr faction in
opposing the occupation.10 If true, this could represent the emergence of a Sunni-
Shiite Islamist anti-occupation coalition.
Later in October 2003, and amid assessments that Moqtada’s popularity is low
and waning further, his supporters stepped up the challenge to the United States. He
named an alternate “government” for Iraq, and some of his followers formed armed
militias and attempted unsuccessfully to seize control of some mosques in Najaf.
Pro-Sadr militants also ambushed some U.S. forces. Press reports say U.S.
commanders are debating how to control Moqtada Al Sadr, with the option of
arresting him apparently under consideration. Possibly to head off any U.S. action
against him, Moqtada tempered some of his statements in October 2003. Another
possible explanation is that Moqtada might be trying to position his movement for
involvement in the transition regime that is to replace the Governing Council; his
involvement would probably require the acquiescence of U.S. authorities in Iraq.
Despite his expressions of moderation, U.S. forces arrested at least one of his top
aides in November 2003.
Ayatollah Sistani/Hawza al-Ilmiyah. The revered Grand Ayatollah Ali al-
Sistani, based in Najaf, was repressed during Saddam’s rule and is emerging as a
major political as well as religious force in post-Saddam Iraq. The United States had
no contact with Sistani when Saddam was in power and has had only limited contact
with him since; he reportedly refuses to meet with representatives of the U.S.
occupation. He is the most senior of the Shiite clerics that lead the Najaf-based
“Hawza al-Ilmiya,” a major grouping of seminaries and Shiite clerics, and numerous
assessments say many Iraqi Shiites follow him and respond to his pronouncements.
Other senior clerics include Ayatollah Mohammad Sa’id Al Hakim, uncle of the slain
SCIRI leader Mohammad Baqr, Ayatollah Mohammad Isaac Fayadh, and Ayatollah
Bashir al-Najafi. The Hawza, which is well funded through donations, is becoming
an important source of political authority in the Shiite regions of Iraq, hiring Iraqis
to perform functions performed by the former regime and issuing directives, often
obeyed, to some Iraqi civil servants. Sistani and the Hawza are generally allied with
SCIRI in the intra-Shiite power struggle, seeking to contain Moqtada Al Sadr, whom
Sistani and SCIRI both view as radical and impulsive.
Sistani, who is of Iranian ethnicity, is considered to be in the tradition of
Ayatollah Khoi in opposing a direct role for clerics in governmental affairs, and
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Sistani and the Hawza have spoken against a direct role for the clerics in governing
post-war Iraq. However, in early July 2003, Sistani began to take a more active role
in Iraq’s post-war decision-making by issuing a statement that the drafters of a new
constitution should be elected, not appointed. That statement, according to some
Iraqi officials, caused a deadlock in the effort to develop a roadmap to the writing of
a constitution; Shiites on the Governing Council reportedly insisted that Sistani’s
directive be followed. Sistani has indicated to other Shiite leaders and Western press
organs that he does not fully support the November 15, 2003 agreement on a political
transition (see below), preferring instead a process consisting of direct elections.
Islamic Amal. Another Shiite Islamist organization, the Islamic Amal
(Action) Organization, has traditionally been allied with SCIRI. In the early 1980s,
Islamic Amal was under the SCIRI umbrella but later broke with it. It is headed by
Mohammed Taqi Modarassi, a Shiite cleric, who returned to Iraq from exile in Iran
in April 2003, after Saddam Hussein’s regime fell. Islamic Amal, which has a
following among Shiite Islamists mainly in Karbala, conducted attacks against
Saddam Hussein’s regime in the 1980s. However, it does not appear to have a
following nearly as large as SCIRI or the other Shiite Islamist groups. Modarassi’s
brother, Abd al-Hadi, headed the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, which
tried to stir up Shiite unrest against the Bahrain regime in the 1980s and 1990s.
Since returning to Iraq in April 2003, Mohammad Taqi has argued against violent
opposition to the U.S. occupation, saying that such a challenge would plunge Iraq
into civil warfare. On November 14, 2003, Modarassi criticized the United States
for not holding elections to any of the political bodies formed thus far.
Schisms Among Anti-Saddam Groups
The differences among the various anti-Saddam organizations led to the near
collapse of the U.S. regime change effort the mid-1990s. As noted above, in May
1994, the KDP and the PUK began clashing with each other over territory, customs
revenues levied at border with Turkey, and control over the Kurdish enclave’s
government based in Irbil. The infighting contributed to the defeat of an INC
offensive against Iraqi troops in March 1995; the KDP pulled out of the offensive at
the last minute. Although it was repelled, the offensive did initially overrun some of
the less well-trained and poorly motivated Iraqi units facing the Kurds. Some INC
leaders point to the battle as an indication that the INC could have succeeded
militarily, without direct U.S. military help, had it been given additional resources
and training in the 1990s.
The Iraqi National Accord (INA). The infighting in the opposition in the
mid-1990s caused the United States to briefly revisit the “coup strategy” by
renewing ties to a non-INC group, Iraq National Accord (INA).11 The INA, originally
founded in 1990 with Saudi support, consisted of defectors from Iraq’s Baath Party,
military, and security services who were perceived as having ties to disgruntled
officials in those organizations. It is headed by Dr. Iyad al-Alawi, former president
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of the Iraqi Student Union in Europe and a physician by training. He is a secular
Shiite Muslim, but most of the members of the INA are Sunni Muslims. The INA’s
prospects appeared to brighten in August 1995 when Saddam’s son-in-law Hussein
Kamil al-Majid — architect of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs —
defected to Jordan, suggesting that Saddam’s grip on the military and security
services was weakening. Jordan’s King Hussein agreed to allow the INA to operate
from there. The INA was ultimately penetrated by Iraq’s intelligence services and,
in June 1996, Baghdad dealt it a serious setback by arresting or executing over 100
INA sympathizers in the military.
Baghdad’s offensive against the opposition accelerated with its August 1996
incursion into northern Iraq, at the invitation of the KDP. Iraq not only helped the
KDP capture Irbil from the PUK, but Saddam’s forces took advantage of their
presence in northern Iraq to strike against the INC base in Salahuddin, a city in
northern Iraq, as well as against remaining INA operatives throughout the north. In
the course of its incursion in the north, Iraq reportedly executed two hundred
oppositionists and arrested as many as 2,000 others. The United States evacuated
from northern Iraq and eventually resettled in the United States 650 oppositionists,
mostly from the INC.
Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, Alawi claimed that the INA was operating
throughout Iraq, and it apparently had rebuilt its presence in Iraq to some extent after
the June 1996 arrests. Although it was cooperating with the INC at the start of the
U.S.-led 2003 war, there is a history of friction between the two groups. Chalabi and
the INC have argued for comprehensive purging of former Baathists from Iraq’s
institutions, while the INA, which has ex-Baathists in it, has argued for retaining
some members of the former regime in official positions. Like the INC, the INA
does not appear to have a mass following in Iraq, but it has close ties to the U.S.
government and does have a constituency among pro-Western Iraqis. In post-
Saddam Iraq, Alawi has also taken the lead in pushing for the establishment of an
internal security service for post-war Iraq, dominated by the major exile factions.
Alawi was part of the major-party grouping that became the core of the Governing
Council, and Alawi has been named a member of that Council and one of its nine-
member rotating presidency; he was president in October 2003.
Attempting to Rebound from 1996 Setbacks
For the two years following the opposition’s 1996 setbacks, the Clinton
Administration had little contact with the opposition. In those two years, the INC,
INA, and other opposition groups attempted to rebuild their organizations and their
ties to each other, although with mixed success. On February 26, 1998, then
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright testified to a Senate Appropriations
subcommittee that it would be “wrong to create false or unsustainable expectations”
about what U.S. support for the opposition could accomplish.
Iraq’s obstructions of U.N. weapons of mass destruction (WMD) inspections
during 1997-1998 led to growing congressional calls for overthrowing Saddam
Hussein, although virtually no one in Congress or outside was advocating a U.S.-led
military invasion to accomplish that goal. A formal congressional push for a regime
change policy began with an FY1998 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 105-174,
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signed May 1, 1998) that, among other provisions, earmarked $5 million in
Economic Support Funds (ESF) for the opposition and $5 million for a Radio Free
Iraq, under the direction of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). The radio
service began broadcasting in October 1998, from Prague. Of the ESF, $3 million
was devoted to an overt program to coordinate and promote cohesion among the
various opposition factions, and to highlighting Iraqi violations of U.N. resolutions.
The remaining $2 million was used to translate and publicize documented evidence
of alleged Iraqi war crimes; the documents were retrieved from the Kurdish north,
placed on 176 CD-ROM diskettes, and translated and analyzed by experts under
contract to the U.S. government. In subsequent years, Congress has appropriated
funding for the Iraqi opposition and for war crimes issues, as shown in the appendix.
Some of the war crimes funding went to the opposition-led INDICT (International
Campaign to Indict Iraqi War Criminals) organization for publicizing Iraqi war
crimes issues.
Iraq Liberation Act
A clear indication of congressional support for a more active U.S. overthrow
effort was encapsulated in another bill introduced in 1998: the Iraq Liberation Act
(ILA, H.R. 4655, P.L. 105-338, signed into law October 31, 1998). The ILA gave the
President authority to provide up to $97 million in defense articles and services (and
authorized $2 million in broadcasting funds) to opposition organizations to be
designated by the Administration. The Act’s passage was widely interpreted as an
expression of congressional support for the concept of promoting an insurgency by
using U.S. air-power to expand opposition-controlled territory. This idea was
advocated by Chalabi and some U.S. experts, such as General Wayne Downing, who
subsequentlybecame a National Security Council official on counter-terrorism in the
first two years of the George W. Bush Administration. President Clinton signed the
legislation despite reported widespread doubts within the Clinton Administration
about the chances of success in promoting an opposition insurgency.
The Iraq Liberation Act made the previously unstated policy of promoting
regime change in Iraq official, declared policy. A provision of the ILA states that it
should be the policy of the United States to “support efforts” to remove the regime
headed by Saddam Hussein. In mid-November 1998, President Clinton publicly
articulated that regime change was a component of U.S. policy toward Iraq. No
specific language in the Act provides for its termination after Saddam Hussein is
removed from power.
The signing of the ILA and the declaration of the overthrow policy came at the
height of the one-year series of crises over U.N. weapons inspections in Iraq, in
which inspections were repeatedly halted and restarted after mediation by the United
Nations, Russia, and others. On December 15, 1998, U.N. inspectors were
withdrawn for the final time, and a three-day U.S. and British bombing campaign
against suspected Iraqi WMD facilities followed (Operation Desert Fox, December
16-19, 1998). (For information on these crises, see CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraq:
Weapons Programs, U.N. Requirements, and U.S. Policy.)
The First ILA Designations. Further steps to promote regime change
followed Operation Desert Fox. In January 1999, a career diplomat, Frank
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Ricciardone, was named as a State Department’s “Coordinator for the Transition in
Iraq,” the chief liaison with the opposition. On February 5, 1999, after consultations
with Congress, the President issued a determination (P.D. 99-13) that the major anti-
Saddam organizations would be eligible to receive U.S. military assistance under the
Iraq Liberation Act: the INC; the INA; SCIRI; the KDP; the PUK; the Islamic
Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK); and the pro-monarchist Movement for
Constitutional Monarchy (MCM). (Because of its possible role in contributing to the
formation of Ansar al-Islam, the IMIK did not receive U.S. support after 2001,
although it was not formally taken off the ILA eligibility list.)
Monarchists/Sharif Ali. The Movement for Constitutional Monarchy is led
by Sharif Ali bin al-Hussein, a relative of the Hashemite monarchs (he is a cousin of
King Faysal II, the last Iraqi monarch) that ruled Iraq from the end of World War I
until 1958. Sharif Ali, who is about 47 and was a banker in London, claims to be the
leading heir to the former Hashemite monarchy, although there are other claimants,
mostly based in Jordan. The MCM was considered a small movement that could not
contribute much to the pre-war overthrow effort, although it was part of the INC and
the United States had contacts with it. In the post-Saddam period, Sharif Ali returned
to Iraq on June 10, 2003, to a small but apparently enthusiastic welcome. He did not
participate extensively in the negotiations with the U.S.-led occupation authority on
the formation of the Governing Council, and neither Sharif Ali nor any of his
followers was appointed to the Governing Council. He left Iraq for London in June
2003, reportedly somewhat disillusioned at the pace of transition to Iraqi self-rule.
In May 1999, in concert with an INC visit to Washington, the Clinton
Administration announced it would draw down $5 million worth of training and
“non-lethal” defense equipment under the ILA. During 1999-2000, about 150
opposition members underwent civil administration training at Hurlburt air base in
Florida, including attending Defense Department-run courses providing civil affairs
training, including instruction in field medicine, logistics, computers,
communications, broadcasting, power generation, and war crimes issues. However,
the Clinton Administration asserted that the opposition was not sufficientlyorganized
to merit U.S. provision of lethal military equipment or combat training. This
restriction reflected divisions within and outside the Clinton Administration over the
effectiveness and viability of the opposition, and over the potential for the United
States to become militarily embroiled in civil conflict in Iraq. The Hurlburt trainees
were not brought into Operation Iraqi Freedom or into the Free Iraqi Forces that
deployed to Iraq toward the end of the active combat phase of the war.
Continued Doubts About the Capabilities
of the Anti-Saddam Groups
During 1999-2000, U.S. efforts to rebuild and fund the opposition did not end
the debate within the Clinton Administration over the regime change component of
Iraq policy. In hearings and statements, several Members of both parties expressed
disappointment with the Clinton Administration’s decision not to give the
opposition lethal military aid or combat training. Many took those decisions as an
indication that the Clinton Administration was skeptical about the opposition’s
capabilities. The Clinton Administration maintained that the Iraqi opposition would
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not succeed unless backed by direct U.S. military involvement and that direct U.S.
military action was not justified by the degree of threat posed by Iraq. Clinton
Administration officials added that supporting the opposition militarily could draw
the United States into long-term military involvement in Iraq. Others suggested the
Clinton Administration should focus instead on rebuilding containment of Iraq by
threatening major use of force, or by launching repeated air strikes, unless and until
Iraq re-admitted the U.N. weapons inspectors that left Iraq in December 1998.
As a reflection of continued congressional support for the overthrow effort, a
provision of the FY2001 foreign aid appropriation (H.R. 4811, P.L. 106-429, signed
November 6, 2000) earmarked $25 million in ESF for “programs benefitting the
Iraqi people,” of which at least $12 million was for the INC to distribute
humanitarian aid inside Iraq; $6 million was for INC broadcasting; and $2 million
was for war crimes issues. According to the appropriation, the remaining $5 million
could be used to provide additional ESF to the seven groups then eligible to receive
assistance under the ILA. Taking note of congressional sentiment for INC
distribution of aid inside Iraq, on September 29, 2000, the Clinton Administration
reached agreement with the INC to provide the organization with $4 million in
FY1999 ESF (one half the total earmark available) to develop a humanitarian aid
distribution plan and to gather information in Iraq on Iraqi war crimes. However,
three days before it left office, the Clinton Administration issued a required report to
Congress that noted that any INC effort to distribute humanitarian aid in areas of Iraq
under Baghdad’s control would be fraught with security risks to the INC, to Iraqi
recipients of such aid, and to any relief distributors with which the INC would
contract.12
Bush Administration Policy
Bush Administration policy toward Iraq started out similar to that of the
previous administration, but changed dramatically after the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks, even though no significant evidence linking Iraq to those attacks
came to light. The shift toward a more assertive policy first became clear in
President Bush’s State of the Union message on January 29, 2002, when he
characterized Iraq as part of an “axis of evil,” along with Iran and North Korea.
Pre-September 11 Policy
Throughout most of its first year, the Bush Administration continued the basic
elements of Clinton Administration policy on Iraq. With no immediate consensus
within the new Administration on how forcefully to proceed with an overthrow
strategy, Secretary of State Powell focused on strengthening containment of Iraq,
which the Bush Administration said had eroded substantially in the year prior to its
taking office. Secretary Powell visited the Middle East in February 2001 to enlist
regional support for a so-called “smart sanctions” plan: a modification of the U.N.
sanctions regime to ensure that no weapons-related technology reached Iraq. His
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plan offered to alter the U.N.-sponsored “oil-for-food” program by relaxing U.N.
restrictions on exports to Iraq of civilian equipment and needed non-military
technology.13
The Administration believed that the “smart sanctions” proposal, by easing the
suffering of the Iraqi people, would cause Iraq’s neighbors and other countries to
cease unilateral violations of the sanctions regime. Powell, who had openly
expressed skepticism about the opposition’s prospects, barely raised the regime
change issue during his trip or in his March 7, 2001, testimony before the House
International Relations Committee, at which he was questioned about Iraq.14 After
about a year of negotiations among the Security Council permanent members, the
major feature of the smart sanctions plan — new procedures that virtually eliminate
U.N. review of civilian exports to Iraq — was adopted on May 14, 2002 (U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1409).
Even though several senior officials had been strong advocates of a regime
change policy, many of the persistent questions about the wisdom and difficulty of
that strategy were debated early in the Bush Administration.15 Aside from restating
the U.S. policy of regime change, the Bush Administration did little to promote that
outcome throughout most of its first year. During his confirmation hearings as
DeputySecretaryof Defense, a leading advocate of overthrowing Iraq’s regime, Paul
Wolfowitz, said that he did not yet see a “plausible plan” for changing the regime.
Like its predecessor, the Bush Administration initially declined to provide the
opposition with lethal aid, combat training, or a commitment of direct U.S. military
help. It eliminated the separate State Department position of “Coordinator for the
Transition in Iraq,” further casting doubt on its enthusiasm for the overthrow strategy.
On February 2, 2001, the Bush Administration confirmed that, shortly after President
Bush took office, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC) granted the INC a license to proceed with information gathering inside Iraq
only, and not actual distribution of humanitarian aid inside Iraq. This decision by the
Administration amounted to withholding U.S. backing for the INC plan to rebuild
its presence inside Iraq.
Many in Congress, on the other hand, continued to support the INC as the
primary vehicle for achieving regime change. Partly in deference to congressional
sentiment, the Bush Administration continued to expand its ties to the INC despite
doubts about its capabilities. In August 2001, the INC began satellite television
broadcasts into Iraq, from London, called Liberty TV. The station was funded by the
FY2001 ESF appropriated by Congress, with start-up costs of $1 million and an
estimated additional $2.7 million per year in operating costs.16
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Post-September 11, 2001: Moving to Change the Regime
Bush Administration policy toward Iraq became notably more assertive after
the September 11, 2001, attacks, stressing regime change and asserting that
containment was failing or, at best, inadequate. Almost immediately after the U.S.-
led war on the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan began in early October 2001,
speculation began building that the Administration might try to change Iraq’s regime
through direct use of military force as part of a “phase two” of the war on terrorism.
Some U.S. officials, reportedly led bydeputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz, believed
that the United States needed to respond to the September 11, 2001 attacks by ending
any or all regimes that support terrorist groups, including Iraq. (Iraq was a designated
state sponsor of terrorism during 1979-82, and was again designated after the 1990
invasion of Kuwait. Iraq remains on the list, despite the change of regime, although
it is expected it will be removed.) As noted above, in his January 29, 2002 State of
the Union message, President Bush named Iraq as part of an “axis of evil,” along
with North Korea and Iran. Vice President Cheney visited the Middle East in March
2002 reportedly to consult regional countries about the possibility of confronting Iraq
militarily, although the countries visited reportedlyurged greater U.S. attention to the
Arab-Israeli dispute and opposed confrontation with Iraq.
The two primary themes in the Bush Administration’s public case for
confronting Iraq were (1) its purported refusal to end its WMD programs, and (2) its
ties to terrorist groups, to which Iraq might transfer WMD for the purpose of
conducting a catastrophic attack on the United States. Most senior officials did not
specifically assert that Iraq was an imminent or immediate threat to U.S. security, but
they did assert that Iraq was a “grave and gathering” threat that was best blunted
before the threat became imminent. U.S. officials said the September 11, 2001,
attacks demonstrated that the United States could not wait for threats to gather before
acting but must instead act preemptively or preventively. The Administration added
that regime change would have the further benefit of liberating the Iraqi people and
promoting stability in the Middle East, possibly facilitating a resolution to the Arab-
Israeli dispute.
Iraq and Al Qaeda. Although they did not assert that Saddam Hussein’s
regime had a direct connection to the September 11 attacks or the subsequent anthrax
mailings, senior U.S. officials said in the runup to the war that there was evidence
of Iraqi linkages to Al Qaeda. (On September 19, 2003, President Bush, in response
to a journalist’s question, said there is no evidence linking Saddam Hussein’s regime
to the September 11 attacks but there is evidence linking that regime to Al Qaeda.)
Secretary of State Powell, as noted above, cited intelligence information that Ansar
al-Islam and its leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, had links to Saddam Hussein’s
regime.17 (See section above on Ansar al-Islam for more information on that
organization and its reputed links to Saddam Hussein’s regime.) Other senior
officials cited intelligence information that Iraq provided advice and training to Al
Qaeda in the manufacture and use of chemical weapons, although Administration
information appears to date to the early 1990s when Iraq, largely isolated after the
first Gulf war, was politically close to Sudan. Al Qaeda founder Osama Bin Laden
CRS-18
18 Hayes, Steven. “Case Closed.” The Weekly Standard, November 24, 2003.
was based in Sudan during that time (1991-1996). The Bush Administration did not
extensively cite reports that Czech intelligence believed that Iraqi intelligence had
met with lead September 11 hijacker Mohammad Atta in Prague in spring 2001,
suggesting official skepticism of those reports. Some outside commentators
believed that those reports indicated a direct Iraqi connection to the September 11
attacks. A Defense Department memo to the Senate, excerpted in the Weekly
Standard (November 24, 2003, issue), purports to contain intelligence information
that the Administration believes demonstrates a long-standing relationship between
Iraq and Al Qaeda.18
Some outside observers express skepticism about Saddam-Al Qaeda
connections because of the ideological differences between Saddam Hussein’s
secular regime and Al Qaeda’s Islamist character. Others noted that bin Laden
sought to raise an Islamic army to fight Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990,
arguing against the need for U.S. troops, and that he was more an enemy of Saddam
Hussein than an ally. Those differences were evident in a February 12, 2003, bin
Laden statement referring to Saddam Hussein’s regime as socialist and infidel,
although the statement exhorted Iraq to resist impending U.S. military action. In the
Administration view, the two shared similar anti-U.S. goals, which outweighed
ideological differences and propelled them into tactical or strategic cooperation.
WMD Threat Perception. Senior U.S. officials asserted the following about
Iraq’s WMD:
! Iraq had worked to rebuild its WMD programs in the nearly 4 years
since U.N. weapons inspectors left Iraq and had failed to comply
with 17 U.N. resolutions, including Resolution 1441 (November 8,
2002), calling for its complete elimination of all WMD programs.
! Iraq used chemical weapons against its own people (the Kurds) and
against Iraq’s neighbors (Iran), implying that Iraq would not
necessarily be deterred from using WMD against the United States
or its allies. Others noted that Iraq did not use such weapons against
adversaries, such as the United States, that have the capability of
destroying Iraq’s government in retaliation. Under the U.S. threat of
massive retaliation, Iraq did not use WMD against U.S. troops in the
1991 Gulf war. On the other hand, Iraq defied U.S. warnings of
retaliation and did burn Kuwait’s oil fields in that war.
! Iraq could transfer its WMD to terrorists such as Al Qaeda who
could use these weapons to cause hundreds of thousands of deaths
in the United States or elsewhere. Critics of this view cited
presentations by CIA Director Tenet to Congress in October 2002,
portions of which were released publicly, stating the CIA view that
Iraq was likely to transfer WMD to terrorists if the United States
were to attack Iraq. At that point, according to that argument,
CRS-19
Saddam Hussein would be left with little incentive not to cooperate
with terrorist groups capable of striking at U.S. interests.
Broadening the Internal Opposition to Saddam
As it began in mid-2002 to prepare for possible military action against Iraq, the
Bush Administration tried to broaden the Iraqi opposition and build up its
capabilities. On June 16, 2002, the Washington Post reported that, in early 2002,
President Bush authorized stepped up covert activities by the CIA and special
operations forces to destabilize Saddam Hussein. In early August 2002, the State and
Defense Departments jointly invited six major opposition groups — the INC, the
INA, the KDP, the PUK, SCIRI, and the MCM — to Washington for meetings with
senior officials, including a video link to Vice President Cheney. The meetings were
held to show unity within the opposition and among different agencies of the U.S.
government, which reportedly tended to favor different opposition groups.
Numerous press reports indicated that the Defense Department and office of Vice
President Cheney believed the INC might be able to lead a post-Saddam regime,
while the State Department believed the INC had little popularity inside Iraq.
In conjunction with the stepped up engagement with the opposition, on August
15, 2002, the State Department agreed to provide $8 million in FY2001 ESF to the
Iraqi National Congress (INC), funds that had been held up due to differences
between the State Department and the INC over what activities would be funded.
Under the agreement, the State Department-provided $8 million was to be used to
fund the INC, during May 2002 to December 2002, to run its offices in Washington,
London, Tehran, Damascus, Prague, and Cairo, and to operate its Al Mutamar
newspaper and Liberty TV. The Defense Department agreed to fund the information
gathering portion of the INC’s activities (about $4 million); the State Department had
refused to fund those activities, which were to be conducted inside Iraq, because of
strains between the INC and other opposition groups and questions about INC use of
U.S. funds.
In addition, the Administration expanded its ties to Shiite Islamist groups and
to groups composed of ex-military and security officers, as well as to some ethnic-
based groups. The groups and individuals with which the Bush Administration had
increasing contact during this period included the following:
1) the Iraqi National Movement, formed in 2001 as an offshoot of the INC. Its
leaders include ex-senior military officer Hassan al-Naqib (who was part of an early
leadership body of the INC) and Hatim Mukhlis, who claimed support of some in
Saddam’s Tikriti clan. Mukhlis has returned to Iraq and reportedly is active
politically.
2) the Iraqi National Front, another ex-military group, founded in March 2000 by
Tawfiq al-Yasseri. Yasseri, a Shiite Muslim ex-military officer, headed Iraq’s
military academy and participated in the post-1991 Gulf war anti-Saddam uprisings.
He has been active politically in Iraq since the fall of Saddam.
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3) the Iraqi Free Officers and Civilians Movement, established in 1996 by ex-officer
Najib al-Salhi. Salhi, who served in the Republican Guard, defected in 1995. He and
his party have been active politically in Iraq since the fall of Saddam.
4) the Higher Council for National Salvation. Based in Denmark, it was established
in August 2002, headed by Wafiq al-Samarra’i, a former head of Iraqi military
intelligence. Ex-chief of staff of Iraq’s military (1980-1991) Nizar al-Khazraji, who
was based in Denmark since fleeing Iraq in 1996, may also be a member. He is under
investigation there for alleged involvement in Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against
the Kurds in 1988. Danish authorities said on March 17, 2003, that Khazraji had
unexpectedly left his home there,19 although his current whereabouts are unknown;
5) the Iraqi Turkmen Front, a small, ethnic Turkomen-based grouping, generally
considered aligned with Turkish policy on Iraq. Turkomens number about 350,000
and live mainly in northern Iraq;
6) the Islamic Accord of Iraq. Based in Damascus, this is another Shiite Islamic
Party, headed by Jamil Wakil — a follower of Ayatollah Shirazi. (Shirazi is an
Iranian cleric who was the spiritual leader of a group called the Islamic Front for the
Liberation of Bahrain, IFLB, see above under Islamic Amal); and
7) the Assyrian Democratic Movement, headed by Yonadam Yousif Kanna. Iraq’s
Assyrian community is based primarily in northern Iraq, but there is a strong diaspora
in the United States. The Bush Administration formally began incorporating the
Assyrian Democratic Movement into its meetings with the Iraqi opposition in
September 2002. (Kanna is on the Governing Council.)
The Opposition Positions Itself Before War/Second ILA
Designations. The Bush Administration applauded efforts during 2001 and 2002
by the ex-military led groups to coordinate with each other and with the INC and
other groups. One such meeting, in July 2002 in London and jointly run with the
INC, attracted over 70 ex-military officers.
As a decision whether to launch military action approached, President Bush
issued a determination (December 9, 2002) to draw down the remaining $92 million
authorized for defense articles and services under the Iraq Liberation Act for the
INA, the INC, the KDP, the PUK, SCIRI, and the MCM “and to such other Iraqi
opposition groups designated by me under the Act before or after this
determination.” That same day, the Bush Administration made six of the ex-military
led factions discussed above (except the Higher Council for National Salvation)
eligible to receive draw downs under the ILA. The announcement appeared to be
part of reported plan to train about 5,000 oppositionists in tasks that could assist U.S.
forces, possibly including combat units.20 An initial group of 3,000 was selected, but
only about 70 oppositionists completed training at an air base (Taszar) in Hungary,
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according to press reports.21 These oppositionists served with U.S. forces in
Operation Iraqi Freedom as translators and mediators between U.S. forces and local
leaders, and most did not stay in Iraq, according to observers.
As the prospects for military action against Iraq grew, the opposition began
planning its role in the war and the post-war period. During December 14-17, 2002,
with U.S. officials attending, major Iraqi opposition groups held a conference in
London. The conference was organized by the same six exile groups whose leaders
visited Washington in August 2002, but included other groups as well, and they
discussed whether the opposition should declare a provisional government. The
Administration opposed that step on the grounds that doing so would give the
impression that the United States was backing the exile groups in their efforts to
dominate post-war Iraq politically. The meeting ended with agreement to form a 65-
member follow-up committee, which some criticized as weighted heavily toward
Shiite Islamist groups such as SCIRI. The opposition met again during February 24-
27, 2003, in northern Iraq, and formed, against the urging of U.S. representatives at
the meeting, a six-seat committee to prepare for a transition regime. The six-person
committee included PUK leader Talabani, KDP leader Barzani, SCIRI leader
Mohammed Baqr Al Hakim, Chalabi, INA leader Alawi, and a former Iraqi foreign
minister Adnan Pachachi. (A member from each of these groups is on the
Governing Council, as is Pachachi.)
Adnan Pachachi, who is about 80, served as foreign minister and ambassador
to the United Nations during the 1960s, under the military governments of Abd al-
Salam and then Abd al-Rahman Arif (“the Arif brothers”). Pachachi lived in exile
in the UAE during Saddam Hussein’s rule, and heads a small party called the “Iraqi
Independent Democrats.”
Decision to Take Military Action. As inspectors worked in Iraq under the
new mandates provided in Resolution 1441, the Administration demanded complete
disarmament and full cooperation by Iraq if that country wanted to avert military
action. In a probable effort to garner international support for any U.S.-led war effort
against Iraq, the Administration had downplayed the goal of regime change in
President Bush’s September 12, 2002, speech before the United Nations General
Assembly, stressing instead the need to enforce U.N. resolutions that required Iraqi
disarmament. However, the Administration resumed stressing the regime change
goal after February 2003 as diplomacy at the United Nations ran its course.
The possibility of war became clearer following the mid-March 2003
breakdown of U.N. diplomacy over whether the U.N. Security Council should
authorize war against Iraq for failing to comply with Resolution 1441. The
diplomatic breakdown followed several briefings for the U.N. Security Council by
the director of the U.N. inspection body UNMOVIC (U.N. Monitoring, Verification,
and Inspection Commission) Hans Blix and the director of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohammad al-Baradei, most recently on March 7, 2003.
The briefings, based on WMD inspections that resumed November 27, 2002, under
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Resolution 1441, were generally critical of Iraq for failing to pro-actively cooperate
to clear up outstanding questions about Iraq’s WMD program. However, the latter
two briefings (February 24 and March 7, 2003) noted progress in clearing up
outstanding WMD questions. The Blix/Baradei briefings said Iraq had not accounted
for its past WMD, but the two did not state that they were certain that Iraq had
retained WMD, or that they had uncovered any banned WMD. Iraq declared short
range ballistic missiles that were determined by Blix to be of prohibited ranges, and
Blix ordered Iraq to destroy them. Iraq began the destruction prior to the launching
of the U.S.-led war. (For more detail on the final round of inspections and evidence
of WMD programs found in the post-war period, see CRS Issue Brief IB92117: Iraq:
Weapons Programs, U.N. Requirements, and U.S. Policy.)
Security Council opponents of war, including France, Russia, China, and
Germany, said the briefings indicated that Iraq could be disarmed peacefully and that
inspections should be given more time. They noted that Iraq was well contained by
sanctions and the U.S./British enforced no-fly zones. Those who agreed with this
view maintained that, as long as Iraq allowed access to U.N. weapons inspections
under Resolution 1441, Iraq could not pose an immediate threat to U.S. national
security. The inspectors reported few, if any, Iraqi obstructions in about 700
inspections of about 400 different sites. Others experts believed that, even if Iraq
were to acquire major new WMD capabilities, Iraq could have been deterred by U.S.
overall strategic superiority, presumably including the U.S. nuclear arsenal.
The United States, Britain, Spain, and Bulgaria disagreed, maintaining that Iraq
had not fundamentally decided to disarm. The Administration asserted on March 17,
2003, that diplomatic options to disarm Iraq peacefully had failed and turned its full
attention to military action. That evening, President Bush gave Saddam Hussein and
his sons, Uday and Qusay, an ultimatum to leave Iraq within 48 hours to avoid war.
They refused the ultimatum, and Operation Iraqi Freedom was launched on March
19, 2003.
In the war, Iraq’s conventional military forces were overwhelmed by U.S. and
British forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom, although the Iraqi military, at times, put
up stiff resistance using unconventional tactics. No major Iraqi militarycommanders
or Baathist political figures came forward to try to establish a post-Saddam
government, but senior regime leaders fled Baghdad, and the whereabouts of some
of the top leadership, including Saddam Hussein, are unknown. No WMD was used,
although Iraq did fire some ballistic missiles into Kuwait. It is not clear whether
those missiles were of ranges prohibited by the United Nations (greater than 150 km).
Post-Saddam Governance Issues
Since Saddam Hussein’s regime vacated Baghdad on April 9, 2003, there has
been increasing debate about the effectiveness of U.S. policy toward Iraq. The
outcome of the debate might depend on such factors as the pace and costs of
reconstruction; the degree of resistance to the U.S.-led occupation; the amount of
WMD ultimately found, if any; and whether a post-Saddam government is stable and
democratic. The same U.S. concerns about fragmentation of and instability in Iraq
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that existed in prior years are present in the current debate over how to establish a
post-Saddam regime. Some experts believe that a post-war Iraq will inevitably fall
under the control of pro-Iranian Shiite Islamist forces who are asserting growing
control over areas inhabited by Iraq’s Shiites. Shiites constitute about 60% of Iraq’s
population but have been under-represented in every Iraqi government since modern
Iraq’s formation in 1920. (For further information on economic reconstruction and
its funding, see CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Recent Developments in Reconstruction
Assistance.)
The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). After the fall of the regime,
the United States set up an occupation structure. The Bush Administration initially
tasked Lt. Gen. Jay Garner (ret.) to direct civilian reconstruction, working through
a staff of U.S. diplomats and other U.S. government personnel who served as
advisers and administrators in Iraq’s various ministries. He headed the Office of
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), within the Department of
Defense, created by a January 20, 2003 executive order. After spending the combat
phase of the war in neighboring Kuwait, Garner and some of his staff of about 200
deployed to Baghdad on April 21, 2003, to begin work.
Press reports said that senior U.S. officials were dissatisfied with the slow pace
of reconstruction under Garner, and on May 6, 2003, the Administration appointed
former ambassador L. Paul Bremer to lead the overall reconstruction effort, with a
focus on political reconstruction. He arrived on May 12, 2003, to head the CPA,
which subsumed ORHA. The appointment represented an apparent adjustment from
the original structure of the U.S. reconstruction effort, although the Administration
stated that it was always envisioned that a civilian would eventually take over the
U.S. effort and denied it was an indication of high-level dissatisfaction with the
effort. U.S. officials now refer to the CPA as an occupying authority legitimized by
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483 of May 22, 2003. Among other provisions,
Resolution 1483 lifted U.N. sanctions on Iraq.
Another alteration of the U.S. post-war structure was made public in early
October 2003; the White House announced that an “Iraq Stabilization Group” under
the direction of National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice would coordinate
interagency support to the CPA in Iraq. The move has been widely viewed as a
diminution in Defense Department control over post-war governance and
reconstruction. The Washington Times reported on January 6, 2004, that the military
side of U.S. operations might soon change with the potential appointment of a four-
star U.S. general as U.S. military commander for Iraq; current operations in Iraq are
headed by a three-star officer, Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez.
Establishing Iraqi Self-Rule
The Administration says that U.S. forces will stay in Iraq until there is a stable,
democratic successor regime that is at peace with its neighbors. However, there has
been some debate between U.S. authorities and key anti-Saddam groups over the
pace and the means to move Iraq to self-government. This debate took on increasing
urgency as resistance attacks on U.S. forces and international organizations in Iraq
escalated in 2003.
CRS-24
22 Transcript: “Bremer Reviews Progress, Plans for Iraq Reconstruction.” Washington File,
June 23, 2003.
Shortly after the regime fell, ORHA director Jay Garner began a process to
establish a successor regime. Senior U.S. officials, including deputy Defense
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, said in early April 2003 that they hoped to have a
successor regime in place within six months of the fall of the regime. The
Administration organized a meeting in Nasiriyah (April 15, 2003) of about 100 Iraqis
of varying ideologies, present by U.S. invitation. Many of the attendees were
representatives of Iraqi tribal groupings that had not been politically active before.
SCIRI, along with several Shiite clerics, boycotted and called for an Islamic state.
A follow-up meeting of about 250 delegates was held in Baghdad on April 26,
ending in agreement to hold a broader meeting, within a month, to name an interim
Iraqi administration. However, in mid-May 2003, U.S. officials, apparently fearing
that existing major groups could not form a stable regime, or that Shiite Islamists
would dominate a successor authority, cut this process off and abandoned public
deadlines for transferring sovereignty to an Iraqi government.
Formation of the Major Party Grouping. In parallel with the April 26
meeting in Baghdad, the five most prominent exiled opposition groups met, with
U.S. envoys present: SCIRI, the INC, the INA, the PUK, and the KDP. On May 9,
2003, the five major parties agreed to expand their grouping to seven, adding to their
ranks the little known Nasir al-Chadirchy, head of a party called the National
Democratic Party of Iraq, as well as the Da’wa Party (see above). The major-party
grouping criticized the U.S. decision in May 2003 to delay the formation of an Iraqi
self-rule authority and to instead form a purely advisory body of 25 to 30 Iraqis.
With U.S. casualties in Iraq mounting and a growing sense of resentment among
the Iraqi population, the U.S.-led occupation authority (Coalition Provisional
Authority, CPA) began tilting back toward the views of the major Iraqi exile parties.
U.S. administrator for Iraq Paul Bremer (see below) said on June 23, 2003, that the
planned 25- to 30-member body would have “real authority” from its first days and
would not be purely advisory. He said it would nominate ministryheads, recommend
policies, and convene a “constitutional conference” to draft a new constitution,22
although it would not assume sovereignty.
The Governing Council and Cabinet. On July 13, 2003, a Governing
Council was unveiled to the Iraqi public, appointed by the U.S.-led CPA but
reflecting the influence of the major-party grouping. It also contained prominent
Iraqis who were never in exile and were not affiliated with the exiled opposition.
Prior to the assassination on September 20, 2003, of Council member Akila al-
Hashimi (a Shiite woman and former foreign ministry official) the Council had 25
members, of which 3 were women and 13 were Shiite Muslims. Of the 12 Shiite
Muslims still on the Council, one seat is held by SCIRI directly (Abd al-Aziz Al
Hakim, younger brother of Mohammad Baqr), one is held by a guerrilla affiliated
with SCIRI(Abdul Karim al-Muhammadawi), two are Da’wa Party (Ibrahim al-Jafari
and Abdul Zahra Othman) leaders, and considered allies of SCIRI, and one is a
former Da’wa activist (Muwaffaq al-Ruba’i). Also on the Council is a moderate
Shiite cleric, Mohammad Bahr al-Ulum, who is not affiliated with SCIRI or Da’wa.
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He headed the Ahl al-Bayt charity center in London since the 1980s. The remaining
Shiite Muslims, such as Chalabi and Iyad al-Alawi, are secular. One Sunni Muslim
Islamist was appointed — Muhsin Abdul Hamid — who heads the Iraqi Islamic
Party; he does not have a clear relationship with the Shiite Islamists on the Council.
(Akila Hashimi’s vacant Council seat was filled on December 8 by Salama al-
Khufaji, a Shiite women who is a dentist and teaches at Baghdad University.)
The Council includes five Kurds, including the two main Kurdish leaders Jalal
Talabani and Masud Barzani. The Kurds are generally considered the most pro-U.S.
of all Iraqi factions and are generally reluctant to openly criticize the CPA.
Although not a cohesive bloc, the Council includes exiles and non-exiles who
generally want a liberal democracy and could be considered generally pro-U.S. Most
prominent among them is Chalabi, but this grouping includes National Democratic
Party leader Nasir al-Chadirchy and Adnan Pachachi, both of whom are Sunni
Muslims. Others most likely to affiliate with this bloc include Sunni businessman
Samir Shakir al-Sumaidy; Sunni tribal member and civil engineer Ghazi al-Yawar,
who is president of Saudi-based Hicap Technology; the Shiite coordinator for the
Human Rights Association of Babel, Ahmad al-Barak; and the two other women
Council members, Songul Chapouk, a member of the Turkomen minority, who heads
the Iraqi Women’s Association, and Raja al-Khuza’i, a Shiite who heads the
maternity hospital in Diwaniyah.
A member of the Assyrian Christian community is on the Council. Yonadam
Kanna, the secretary-general of the Democratic Assyrian Movement, is on the body.
It is not known with what other members of the Council, if any, he might be aligned.
Also unclear is whether Hamid al-Musa, the Shiite head of the Iraqi Communist
Party, is allied with anyone else on the Council.
The major factions not directly represented on the Council are varied. They
include the Sadr movement; the Baath Party or other Sunni elements of the former
regime; and the Movement for Constitutional Monarchy. The Shiite Islamists on the
Council consult with Ayatollah Sistani, but Sistani is not represented directly on the
Council. Some key tribes do not have members on the Council either. Partly in
response to their exclusion from the U.S.-supported political process, in December
some Sunni Arabs formed a “shura” (consultative council) to possibly negotiate with
the CPA and other factions on behalf of Sunni Arabs. However, some U.S. officials
reportedly are suspicious of the new shura as a potential front for the resistance, and
it is not clear to what extent the CPA might negotiate with it. In some of the above
cases, the CPA did not want to include a particular faction; in other cases, a faction
might not have wanted to be associated with the occupation.
In late July 2003, the Council decided that nine Council members will rotate as
chairpersons, each for one month. Those who rotate that post are Ibrahim Jafari
(Da’wa Party), Chalabi, Alawi of the INA, Talabani (PUK), Hakim (SCIRI),
Pachachi, Barzani (KDP), Bahr al-Ulum, and Abdul Hamid, the Sunni Islamist.
Among its first actions, the Council authorized the establishment of an Iraqi
war crimes tribunal for Saddam and associates accused of major human rights abuses.
It empowered a three-member delegation to seek formal U.N. recognition; Chalabi,
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Pachachi, and Akila Hashimi, traveled to the United Nations in July 2003 and
received a supportive statement from Secretary General Kofi Annan. No decision
on seating the Governing Council at the United Nations was announced, although
some governments in the region, including that of Iran, have recognized the Council.
The Council helped develop a plan, announced September 21, 2003, to open Iraq’s
economy to foreign investment and many of its companies to foreign ownership. In
early December 2003, the Council decided to expel from Iraqi territory any members
of an exiled Iranian opposition group called the People’s Mojahedin, a signal of
goodwill toward neighboring Iran.
Cabinet. The Council has filled out a governmental structure, and on
September 3, 2003, a 25-member cabinet was sworn in. Its composition has roughly
the same factional and ethnic balance of the Council itself. Two “ministers” —
Ibrahim Bahr al-Ulum (oil ministry) and Ali al-Alawi (trade ministry) — are close
relatives of Council members. Another, “foreign minister” Hoshyar Zibari, is a
longtime close aide to KDP chief Masud Barzani. Zibari served during most of the
1990s as KDP representative in Washington. Longtime PUK activist Abdul-Latif
Rashid is the “minister” of water resources. No “defense minister” was named,
because U.S.-led military forces are responsible for defense.
The “interior minister” is Nuri Badran, an INA activist. Badran is attempting
to build on the INA’s contacts among ex-Baathists and ex-military people to develop
a new domestic intelligence and national police network,23 although recruitment of
such categories of Iraqis has raised suspicions of other Governing Council members,
such as Ahmad Chalabi. Chalabi has been the most vocal of all major post-Saddam
figures in calling for the complete dismissal and isolation of all those with ties to the
former regime.
Roadmap to Sovereignty/November 2003 Transition Plan. Press
reports began to appear in late August 2003 that U.S. authorities were dissatisfied at
the relatively low level of activity of the Governing Council, and were pressing it to
take a more prominent and public role in post-war political decision-making. Several
Council members said that the Council could not do so unless and until the U.S.-led
coalition begins transferring greater authority to it.24 Friction also emerged in
October 2003 over a time-frame for a return to Iraqi sovereignty; the major exile
parties on the Council want an early restoration of Iraqi sovereignty. Other tensions
emerged over U.S. acceptance of Turkey’s offer to send peacekeeping troops to Iraq;
most Iraqi resent Turkey as the successor of the Ottoman Empire that ruled Iraq for
the 400 years prior to World War I.
Differences also appeared over the Council’s failure to agree on a process for
drafting a new constitution and holding national elections. The Bush Administration
had linked completion of these steps to the end of the U.S. occupation and a
restoration of full Iraqi sovereignty. In early August 2003, the Governing Council
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tapped INC activist Kanaan Makiya to head a 25-person committee that will
determine the process for drafting the constitution. However, the committee
deadlocked, with some arguing for an appointed constitutional drafting commission
and others, such as Ayatollah Sistani, saying the drafters should be elected. Secretary
of State Powell said in late September 2003 that the Iraqis should be able to draft a
constitution within six months, although Iraqi officials subsequently said it would
be very difficult to meet that deadline. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1511, of
October 16, 2003, invited the Council to develop a timetable by December 15, 2003,
for drafting a constitution.
In mid-November, with popular resistance to the occupation appearing to grow
and resistance attacks becoming more effective, as outlined in a reported CIA
assessment,25 CPA administrator Bremer flew to Washington to consult with
President Bush and other members of the national security team. According to press
accounts, President Bush authorized Bremer to discuss with the Governing Council
a new plan to accelerate the transfer of political sovereignty to Iraqis. On November
15, the CPA and the Governing Council announced they had reached agreement on
a plan that, according to several press reports, includes the following:
! the writing of a provisional constitution, or set of “Basic Laws,” to
be completed by February 28, 2004. By the end of March 2004,
there is to be agreement on the future relationship between a
sovereign Iraqi government and U.S. forces.
! the establishment of 15-person committees in each of Iraq’s 18
provinces, who will in turn select participants for broader local
caucuses. The 15-person committees are to be established by
January 21, 2004; of the 15 in each committee, five will be
appointed by the Governing Council, five by provincial councils,
and five by town councils. By the end of May 2004, the caucuses
are to select members of a 250-member national assembly. It is
reportedly these procedures that could be modified to satisfy
Ayatollah Sistani’s demands (see below) for elections; some reports
say there might be a decision to allow the provincial or town
councils to elect delegates rather than select them.
! By July 1, 2004, the selection by the 250 member national assembly
of members of an executive branch, including designation of a
provisional leader of Iraq. This new provisional government is to
assume sovereignty. According to Bremer, there is to be an
agreement between the transition government and the United States
on the continuation of the U.S. military presence.
! By March 15, 2005, elections of drafters of a permanent
constitution. The elections are to be managed by the transition
government.
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! By December 31, 2005, the holding of national elections for a
permanent government.
The agreement has attracted mixed reviews both abroad and within Iraq. Some
believe that it will lead to a relatively rapid restoration of sovereignty that should
calm resistance. Others believe it represents a U.S. effort to draw down its presence
in Iraq to minimize further U.S. casualties, and that the political process outlined will
not ensure formation of a genuine democracy, but rather a coalition of individual
factions. Others believe that the process outlined is relatively vague and that much
infighting will result at each stage of the process, including the selection of caucus
participants, the naming of assembly members, the selection of a transition
government, and the naming of a leader of the transition government. Some believe
the process will favor the well-organized former exile parties, although others believe
the plan provides sufficient opportunity for newly enfranchised groups and
individuals in Iraq to gain some say in the political transition. Some members of the
Governing Council say that the Council should remain in existence as part of a
transition government after that government is established; this suggests that some
Governing Council figures fear they might not be selected to be part of a new
governing body under the agreed upon process.
As part of the governance planning process that took place before the war, the
U.S. State Department supported a group of Iraqi exiles to address issues that would
confront a successor government.26 The State Department working group (the
“Future of Iraq Project”) does not appear to have significant influence on any post-
war regime decision-making in Iraq, although some Iraqis who participated are now
in various Iraqi official bodies. Some experts believe the Defense Department was
promoting a competing or separate group of exiles.27 The State Department project,
which cost $5 million, consisted of working groups that discussed (1) transitional
justice; (2) public finance; (3) public and media outreach; (4) democratic principles;
(5) water, agriculture, and the environment; (6) health and human services; (7)
economyand infrastructure; (8) education; (9) refugees, internally-displaced persons,
and migration policy; (10) foreign and national security policy; (11) defense
institutions and policy; (12) free media; (13) civil societycapacity-building; (14) anti-
corruption measures; and (15) oil and energy.
Iraqi Resistance and U.S. Security Operations
Experts note that the U.S. policy debate has intensified since September 2003
because of the apparently escalating Iraqi resistance, an increasing number of U.S.
casualties taken, and the slow rate at which such U.S. initiatives such as the
establishment of a democratic successor regime is moving forward. At present, about
145,000 U.S. and British troops are in Iraq; of those, about 130,000 are U.S.
personnel and about 12,000 are British. There are an additional 16,000 foreign
forces, deploying in accordance with international commitments to post-war
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peacekeeping (see below). Earlier press reports said the Administration wanted to
draw the U.S. force level down to about 35,000 by the end of 2003, but continued
unrest and insecurity in Iraq appear to have made that goal untenable, and some press
reports say that Defense Department officials estimate that over 100,000 U.S. troops
might still be in Iraq in the summer of 2004, and perhaps that many as late as 2006.
Other reports says the Administration wants to try to reduce U.S. forces to 100,000
by mid-2004 and to 50,000 by 2005.28
The Capture of Saddam Hussein. On December 13, 2003, U.S. forces
captured Saddam Hussein in the town of Ad Dur, nine miles south of his hometown,
Tikrit, in Iraq’s predominately Sunni tribal area north of Baghdad. Saddam, who had
been hiding in a tiny cellar on a farm with $750,000 and a pistol, surrendered to
soldiers of the Fourth Infantry Division without a fight. He is being held at an
undisclosed location where he is being interrogated for information on the location
of resistance leaders and members of his former regime. According to unnamed U.S.
officials, Saddam has provided some information that has led to the arrests of several
high-ranking ex-Iraqi officials. The Bush Administration has announced that it
intends to hand Hussein over to Iraqi officials to face an Iraqi-run tribunal and
charges of genocide and crimes against humanity.
In an address to the nation a day after Saddam Hussein’s arrest, President Bush
cautioned Americans that Saddam’s capture does not mean the end of violence in
Iraq. Saddam Hussein’s role in the Iraqi resistance movement is unclear. Some
analysts believe that Hussein made general provisions for guerrilla warfare prior to
the start of hostilities in March 2003 but had little direct influence over day-to-day
activities of guerilla cells. Many observers have questioned what kind of impact
Hussein’s arrest will have on the Iraqi resistance. Some speculate that Hussein’s
arrest will motivate more Iraqis to actively oppose the U.S. occupation since some
Iraqis oppose the U.S. occupation but did not want to associate themselves with
Saddam Hussein. Others note that Hussein’s arrest could weaken the motivation of
his former supporters to continue fighting. Finally, some analysts note that there are
several strands of Iraqi resistance, one directly under the control of Hussein
supporters and another, more decentralized movement, led by former Iraqi army
members and Islamic fundamentalists.
The Resistance. U.S. commanders in Iraq said in early October 2003 that the
sophistication and capabilities of the armed resistance to the U.S. governance of Iraq
is growing. Centcom commander John Abizaid had said on July 17, 2003, that the
United States faces a “classic guerrilla war” led by “mid-level Baath Party activists
organized regionally.” Some elements of the resistance appear to want to restore the
old regime, while others appear to be motivated by opposition to foreign rule or the
goal of forming an Islamic state. Other resistance fighters appear to be motivated by
the difficulty the U.S. and British authorities have had in restoring civilian services
or to avenge the accidental killing of Iraqi civilians during U.S. operations. On
average, there are about 20 attacks on U.S. forces per day, down from more than 40
per day prior to Saddam’s capture. Resistance attacks have killed about 250 U.S.
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military personnel since President Bush declared an end to “major combat
operations” in Iraq on May 1, 2003, and about 15 of those have come subsequent to
Saddam’s capture. The most lethal resistance attack was the November 2 shoot-
down of a U.S. Chinook helicopter, killing 15 American forces. Another incident,
the November 15 collision of two Blackhawks killing 17 American soldiers might
have been the result of one helicopter trying to avoid ground fire.
U.S. militaryoperations are focused on hunting down guerrilla resistance leaders
and their suspected Baathist financiers. U.S. forces have conducted at least six sweep
operations since mid-June 2003 to search for Baath and other oppositionists; these
operations were given the names Peninsula Strike (June 9-15); Desert Scorpion (June
15-August 1); Sidewinder (June 29-July7); Soda Mountain (July12-17); IvySerpent
(July 12 - early September); Ivy Focus (September 10 - ongoing); Ivy Cyclone and
Ivy Cyclone II (November 4-ongoing); Iron Hammer; and Iron Grip. Iron Hammer,
which was launched as response to growing resistance attacks, began on November
12; it has included air attacks on insurgent positions near Baghdad and nearby towns.
The Bush Administration says resistance comes not only from remnants of the
Baath Party but also from Arab volunteers, possibly linked to or supportive of Al
Qaeda, who have come to Iraq from other countries to fight the U.S. occupation.
U.S. military officials say they have arrested about 200 foreign fighters in recent
sweep operations, although several commanders have said the foreign fighters are not
a large factor in the resistance activity. Resistance attacks are more frequent in the
Sunni areas of central Iraq, where support for Saddam Hussein’s regime was
traditionally stronger than elsewhere, but there have been several deadly attacks in
the Shiite south.
Some U.S. military officials, including Gen. Abizaid,29 put the resistance
numbers at about 5,000, although they do not explain precisely how they arrive at
that figure. The resistance has operated in relatively small cells, although some U.S.
commanders believe that members of Saddam’s inner circle who are still at large
might be coordinating some resistance elements. Since November 2003, U.S.
commanders have said they believe the resistance is acquiring a more nationwide
structure. Some resistance factions have identified themselves as distinct groups,
scribbling warnings and faxing statements to the Arab satellite television network Al
Jazeera, UAE-based Al Arabiya TV, and other outlets. Suggesting a mix of
nationalist and Islamist factions, they are identifying themselves with names such as:
! Al Awda (the Return), believed to be one of the largest and most
active resistance group;
! Saddam’s Fedayeen, remnants of the paramilitary force that were the
most tenacious of Iraqi forces during the 2003 major combat;
! Saddam’s Jihad;
! the Movement of the Victorious Sect;
! Iraq’s Revolutionaries - Al Anbar’s Armed Brigades;
! The Popular Resistance for the Liberation of Iraq;
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! the Salafist Jihad Group (Salafi is a Sunni extremist Islamic
movement);
! Armed Islamic Movement for Al Qaeda - Falluja Branch. Actual
linkages to Al Qaeda, if any, are not known;
! Jaysh (Army) of Mohammad, said to be a highly active group;
! Black Banners Group;
! Nasirite Organization; and
! Armed Vanguard of the Second Mohammad Army. Claimed
responsibility for U.N. headquarters bombing and threatened attacks
on any Arab countries that participate in Iraq peacekeeping. The
credibility of the claim is not known.
The continuing resistance has complicated the U.S. mission. In addition to
targeting U.S. forces, resistance fighters have assassinated Iraqis who are
cooperating with the United States and attacked Iraqi oil export pipelines and water
and other infrastructure facilities, as well as symbols of the international presence,
including U.N. headquarters. By attacking these targets, the resistance appears to be
hoping to cause international relief workers and peacekeeping forces to leave Iraq,
slow reconstruction, and turn the Iraqi populace against the occupation.
An apparent suicide “terrorism” dimension to the resistance began to emerge in
August 2003 with car and truck bombings in Baghdad of the embassy of Jordan
(August 7) and U.N. headquarters at the Canal Hotel (August 19). The latter
bombing killed 23 persons including the U.N. representative in Iraq, Sergio Vieira
de Mello, and prompted some drawdown in U.N. and non-governmental organization
personnel in Iraq. The August 29, 2003, car bombing in Najaf that killed Mohammad
Baqr Al Hakim may have killed over 100 persons, according to news reports.
Smaller suicide bombings have occurred since at Iraqi police facilities, the U.N.
compound, and other sites. On October 25, 2003, the resistance rocketed the hotel
at which visiting deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz was staying; he was unhurt.
The next day, there were four suicide car bombings at various sites in Baghdad,
including the headquarters of the International Committee of the Red Cross. A
November 12 resistance suicide attack killed 17 Italian peacekeepers at their
headquarters in Nasiriyah.
On the other hand, the Administration maintains that the resistance is not
derailing the U.S. mission to bring about reconstruction and that the insurgency can
and will be defeated. Administration fact sheets and statements say that life is, for
the most part, returning to normal throughout Iraq. Electricity is nearly back to pre-
war levels (4,400 Megawatts, pre-war). A new currency has been introduced and has
begun circulation. Schools and hospitals have reopened throughout Iraq, and about
3 million Iraqi children have been vaccinated since Saddam fell. Administration
officials also say Iraqis are freer than at any time in the past 30 years, with a free
press and the ability to organize politically. Elections for some new local leaders, to
replace those appointed by U.S.-led forces in the immediate aftermath of the fall of
the regime, began in some towns, including Basra, in December 2003.
“Iraqification”/Building Security Institutions. An option for improving
security conditions that has been pursued by the Administration is to try to
increasingly transfer security responsibilities to Iraqi institutions. Some in the
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Administration appear to prefer this option to alternatives, advocated by some in and
outside the Administration, that involve turning over greater responsibility to the
international community in exchange for donations of peacekeeping forces. This
initiative is an attempt to improve security in Iraq, generate better intelligence on
resistance factions, and free up U.S. forces for counter-insurgency missions. It is
hoped that these institutions could eventually take over the security function from the
United States. As of late December, about 130,000 Iraqis have been recruited to
these institutions, and the goal is to have about 220,000 Iraqis serving in these
institutions by 2004. However, there are concerns about the loyalty and dedication
of the new recruits, in the absence of Iraqi sovereignty and a clearly defined
governing structure. Some Iraqi forces have fought crime and the resistance and
helped put down protests, but others have sometimes abandoned their posts and
allowed their facilities to be attacked or fought poorly in defense. Some military
recruits have deserted, and some police have been absentees.
On November 21, 2003, the Bush Administration issued a determination
repealing a U.S. ban on arms exports to Iraq so that the United States can supply
weapons to the new Iraqi security institutions. Authority to repeal this ban was
requested and granted in an FY2003 emergency supplemental appropriations (P.L.
108-11) for the costs of the war. The provision (Section 1504) gives the President
the authority to export to Iraq non-lethal military equipment and to export military
equipment to a reconstituted or interim Iraqi military if the President determines that
doing so is in the national interest. (Section 1503 requires the President to submit
regular reports to Congress on any export licenses granted for the exportation of dual
use items to Iraq.)
A related issue is the apparent U.S. agreement in early December 2003 to a
proposal by the major Iraqi parties on the Governing Council to deploy their
individual militia fighters to help augment security.30 About 800 militiamen drawn
from the five major parties on the Governing Council (INA, INC, SCIRI, PUK, KDP)
are to work side by side with the new security institutions, particularly the Civil
Defense Corps.31 Manyof these party-based militiamen have substantial training and
knowledge of Iraqi society, skills that could benefit efforts to maintain security. The
potential risks of the plan are that the party-based militias would likely retain
loyalties to their party leaders, not necessarily to an Iraqi government. Another risk
is that there might be tensions among the various militias that might erupt into
internecine violence.
The following, based on a variety of press reports, are the pillars of the Iraqi
security institutions:
! New Army. The CPA formally disbanded the former Iraqi army
following Bremer’s arrival in Baghdad. Some criticized the move
as a factor that is now contributing to resistance activity, but others
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believe the move was necessary to ensure that Iraq moves toward
democracy. As part of U.S. efforts to build new Iraqi security
institutions, the CPA is in the process of training recruits for a
planned 40,000 person New Iraqi Army, about 10% the size of the
pre-war Iraqi force. The force is expected to be at or near full
strength by mid-2004, although some experts believe that this is too
rapid a pace to ensure proper training and ensure the loyalty of all
recruits. Recruits are paid $60 per month and receive nine weeks of
training. Former Defense Department official Walter Slocombe is
in charge of forming the new Iraqi army; according to him, many
soldiers of the former army are being recruited, but former members
who were at the top four ranks of the Baath Party are not eligible for
recruitment. The first 700 recruits were graduated in early October
2003, but nearly half deserted due to low pay, according to a recent
press report.32 Another 700 recruits graduated in earlyJanuary2004.
The Administration requested about $2 billion to train and equip the
new army in its FY2004 supplemental funding request; that level of
funding is provided by the FY2004 supplemental appropriation (P.L.
108-106).
! Police. The CPA is also trying to turn policing functions over to
Iraqis. Overall, about 62,000 Iraqi policemen have returned to their
jobs, near the total goal of about 85,000. The police are undergoing
training in Hungary, and Jordan has begun training the first of what
will be 32,000 Iraqi police to train there. Police are paid $60 per
month, and must pass a background check ensuring they do not have
a record of human rights violations or criminal activity. The
Administration has requested about $1 billion to train and equip an
Iraqi police force in its FY2004 supplemental funding request; $950
million was appropriated in P.L. 108-106.
! The CPA has is also building a paramilitary “Civil Defense Corps,”
deployed in each of Iraq’s provinces, to assist in maintaining order
and combating insurgents. As of December 2003, about 8,500 have
been deployed; the goal is for a Corps of 40,000. Recruits are paid
$50 per month and cannot have served in Iraq’s former army at a
level of colonel or higher. Some units of the Corps began patrols on
their own, without direct U.S. assistance, in late December 2003.
! A separate “Facilities Protection Service” is being deployed to guard
installations such as oil pumping stations, electricity substations, and
government buildings. About 48,000 (near the goal) have been
deployed, but training is said to be minimal and some are unarmed.
The Administration has requested about $140 million to train and
equip the Civil Defense Corps and Facilities Protection Service in
the FY2004 supplemental funding request; that amount was
appropriated in P.L. 108-106.
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! The CPA has thus far recruited 12,000 Iraqis into a customs and
border protection force. Members of this force receive a few weeks
of U.S. training.
Internationalization/U.N. Role.33 Some believe that enlisting greater
international participation in peacekeeping would be more effective than the rapid
recruitment of Iraqi security institutions, or other options such as increasing the
number of U.S. troops in Iraq. Very few commentators or U.S. politicians advocate
an immediate pullout of U.S. forces from Iraq on the grounds that doing so could
yield chaos in Iraq. At times over the past six months, it appeared that the
Administration had decided or was about to decide on a strategy of greater
international participation in post-Saddam security, although it appears the
Administration is still de-emphasizing this option.
Thus far, 29 countries (in addition to the United States and Britain) have
committed forces to help secure Iraq. The United Kingdom and Poland are leading
multinational divisions in southern Iraq and central Iraq, respectively. The UK-led
force numbers about 14,000, of which all but 2,000 are British forces. The Polish-led
force numbers about 9,200, of which 2,300 are Polish. About 30,000 non-U.S.
troops are or will soon be on the ground in Iraq (including 12,000 British).
Confirmed force pledges include those in Table 1, below. For a more thorough list,
which includes contributions of support or medical personnel, see CRS Report
RL32105.
After some earlier hesitation due to security concerns, Japan and South Korea,
are deploying forces to Iraq. In November, Japan formally approved a deployment
of nearly 1,000 troops in a non-combat role on December 10. South Korea is sending
3,000 troops to help patrol in and around the city of Kirkuk, in the north. On October
7, the Turkish parliament approved a government recommendation to send up to
10,000 peacekeeping forces, but the pledge drew criticism from Iraq’s Governing
Council that Turkey would likely use the deployment to meddle in Iraq’s internal
affairs. Turkey subsequently informed the United States that Iraqi opposition made
the deployment unworkable at this time.
Since the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Administration has sought U.N. backing
for its post-war efforts. Resolution 1483 (adopted unanimously) provided for a U.N.
special representative to coordinate the activities of U.N. personnel in Iraq and to
help establish a successor government. The SecretaryGeneral subsequently(May27,
2003) appointed de Mello (see above) for that post. The resolution also gave the
United Nations a monitoring role over the Development Fund for Iraq, the account
controlled by the CPA for reconstruction. The resolution did not authorize a return
to Iraq of U.N. weapons inspectors, although the resolution provided for deliberations
on that issue. Some International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors returned to Iraq
in June 2003 on a limited nuclear mission in Baghdad. On August 14, 2003, the U.N.
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Security Council adopted a compromise resolution, Resolution 1500, that
“welcomed,” but did not “endorse,” the formation of the Governing Council, an
apparent nod to U.S. requests. The resolution also enhanced U.N. authority in Iraq
somewhat by establishing a “U.N. Assistance Mission for Iraq.” The resolution did
not formally authorize an international peacekeeping force for Iraq ; Resolution 1483
already “calls on” governments to contribute forces for stabilization) and did not
measurably dilute U.S. authority over post-war governance in Iraq.
These resolutions did not satisfy the requirements of several major nations, such
as France, that want to phase out the U.S.-led occupation in favor of a U.N.-led
governance process. The United States obtained agreement on Resolution 1511
(adopted unanimously on October 16, 2003) that authorized a “multinational force
under unified command.” However, the resolution did not meet the core demands
of France and did not attract new troop pledges from either France, Germany, Russia,
India, or Pakistan.
Some in the Bush Administration reportedly have not wanted to cede control
over post-war governance to the United Nations or other nations; they maintain that
doing so would confuse the post-war command structure and possibly lead to the
formation of a government in Iraq that is not committed to democracy and not
necessarily pro-U.S. The position of U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan appears to
be close to that of France; he has cut U.N. staff in Iraq because of security concerns
and said the United Nations should play a larger role in Iraq’s transition to
sovereignty. On the other hand, suggesting that the Administration is revisiting its
former stance to keep U.N. involvement circumscribed, Secretary of State Powell
said in November 2003 that the United States might seek formal U.N. backing for the
November 15, 2003, transition governance plan (see above). The move reportedly
would also include giving the United Nations a major role in assisting the transition
and recognizing the sovereign transition government.
During negotiations on Resolution 1511, a number of different formulas were
discussed for broadening peacekeeping duties in Iraq. Deputy Secretary of State
Richard Armitage told journalists in late August 2003 that one idea under discussion
was for a multinational force, under U.N. leadership, that would be commanded by
a U.S. military official.34 Another possibility was for NATO to command a
multilateral force. The United States had some discussions with NATO on whether
the organization would take on Iraq as a fifth peacekeeping mission, and Defense
Secretary Rumsfeld said at a December 1, 2003, NATO meeting that the United
States would welcome more NATO involvement in Iraq. (NATO currently provides
some logistical support to the international forces in Iraq led by Poland.) On July 10,
2003, the Senate adopted an amendment, by a vote of 97-0, to a State Department
authorization bill (S. 925) calling on the Administration to formally ask NATO to
lead a peacekeeping force for Iraq. A related bill (H.R. 2112) was introduced in the
House on May 15, 2003. (For more information on this possibility, see CRS Report
RL32068, An Enhanced European Role in Iraq?)
CRS-36




































35 For information on Iraq’s oil industry and its reconstruction, see CRS Report RS21626,
Iraq Oil: Reserves, Production, and Potential Revenues. For information on U.S. and other
funding for Iraq’s reconstruction, see CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Recent Developments in
Reconstruction Assistance.
Restarting Iraq’s Economy
One of the major functions of the CPA is to accomplish economic
reconstruction. By all accounts, restoring Iraq’s economy depends, in large part, on
rehabilitating Iraq’s energy infrastructure.35
The Oil Industry/Revenues for Reconstruction. As the driver of Iraq’s
economy, the rebuilding of the oil industry is receiving substantial U.S. attention. It
has been widely assumed that Iraq’s vast oil reserves, believed second only to those
of Saudi Arabia, would be used to fund much of the costs of reconstruction. Then
presidential spokesman Ari Fleischer said on February 18, 2003, referring to Iraq’s
oil reserves, that Iraq has “a variety of means ... to shoulder much of the burden for
[its] own reconstruction.” Many observers had been concerned that an Iraqi regime
on the verge of defeat could destroy its own oil fields, but coalition forces quickly
secured Iraq’s southern oil fields after combat began. Only about 9 oil wells were set
on fire, of a total of over 500 oil fields in that region, and all were put out quickly.
The northern oil fields in Kirkuk and Mosul were not set afire.
In early May 2003, the U.S.-led coalition set up an advisory board, headed by
former Shell executive Phillip Carroll, to oversee the rebuilding of Iraq’s oil sector.
An Iraqi oil industry professional, Thamer Ghadhban, was named to serve as head
of the interim management team that has run Iraq’s oil ministry and reported to the
advisory board. The first exports began in late June 2003, but exports were running
at only about 800,000 barrels per day as of late September 2003 due to sabotage and
the slow pace of sector reconstruction. Iraq’s new “Oil Minister,” Ibrahim Bahr al-
Ulum, said Iraq was exporting over 1 million barrels per day as of early October, and
exports are said to be about 1.5 million barrels per day as of late November. Iraq’s
pre-war export rate was about 2.2 million barrels per day, a level that U.S. and Iraqi
officials say they hope to reach in the first quarter of 2004. The FY2004
supplemental appropriations request asked for $1.2 billion to repair Iraq’s oil
infrastructure, plus $900 million to import refined energy products that Iraq’s
infrastructure cannot currently produce until it is repaired. P.L. 108-106 provided the
requested amount for infrastructure, but only about $700 million for imports of
energy products.
A related issue is long-term development of Iraq’s oil industry and which
foreign energy firms, if any, might receive preference for contracts to explore Iraq’s
vast reserves. Russia, China, and others are said to fear that the United States will
seek to develop Iraq’s oil industry with minimal participation of firms from other
countries.
CPA Budget. The CPA-produced budget for Iraq for calendar 2003, which
is based on the planned levels of oil exports, assumed that oil revenues would yield
about $3.5 billion through the end of 2003, and provide about half of the
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approximately $6.6 billion budget for Iraq for the period. At inception, the DFI Iraq
contained about $7 billion when it was established in June 2003, consisting of
captured Iraqi assets, Iraqi assets abroad, the monies transferred from the oil-for-food
account, and U.S. funds available for reconstruction (FY2003 supplemental, P.L.
108-11, which appropriated about $2.5 billion for reconstruction).
In order to accelerate reconstruction, the DFI was deemed to require
international donations, such as those pledged at the October 23-24 donors’
conference in Madrid, additional U.S. appropriations, and funds remaining after the
U.N.-run “oil for food program” terminated on November 21, 2003 (see below). A
World Bank estimate, released in early October 2003, said Iraq reconstruction would
require about $56 billion during 2004-2007, including the $20 billion in U.S. funding
requested by the Administration in September 2003. At the Madrid donors
conference, donors pledged about $4 billion in grants and $9 billion in credits, in
addition to the $20 billion to be provided by the United States. (For additional
information on international pledges, see CRS Report RL32015, Post-War Iraq: A
Table and Chronology of Foreign Contributions.)
Supplemental Funding Needs.36 Partly because oil revenues have lagged
behind projections, in late August 2003 Bremer visited Washington to talk to other
Administration officials about the need to ask Congress for immediate supplemental
funds for reconstruction needs, which Bremer estimates will run into the “several
tens of billions” over the next year. On September 8, 2003, President Bush stated
that he would request supplemental funding for FY2004 for the “war on terrorism,”
in the amount of $87 billion, of which over $70 billion would be for military
operations in and reconstruction of Iraq. Of that amount, about $50 billion would be
for military costs and about $20 billion for reconstruction of Iraq.
The FY2004 supplemental appropriation (conf. report H.Rept. 108-337, P.L.
108-106) provided the following funds for Iraq reconstruction (total $18.7 billion):
! $3.243 billion for security and law enforcement, including the New
Iraqi Army. border enforcement and other security functions;
! $1.32 billion for justice and civil society and democracy
development, including programs for women and youth, and the
formation of an independent human rights commission,
! $5.56 billion for electricity infrastructure rehabilitation,
! $1.89 billion for rehabilitating the energy infrastructure,
! $4.332 billion to repair water and sewage systems;
! $500 million for repair of transportation and telecommunications
infrastructure,
! $370 million to upgrade housing, roads, and bridges,
! $800 million to construct and equip hospitals and clinics, and
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! $453 million for education, jobs training, and private sector
initiatives.
DFI Current Balance. As of December 3, 2003, and prior to transfers of
monies appropriated by the supplemental (P.L. 108-106), the Development Fund for
Iraq (DFI), set up by Resolution 1483, had a balance of $4.98 billion. (During
October and November, an additional $2 billion was transferred to the DFI from the
oil-for-food escrow account.)
In late October 2003, a multilateral board to monitor the DFI, mandated by
Resolution 1483, was established (the International Advisoryand Monitoring Board).
The DFI is held in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, not Iraq’s Central Bank,
as outlined in Resolution 1483.
Termination of the Oil-for-Food Program. About 60% of Iraqis have
been receiving all their foodstuffs from the U.N.-supervised Oil-for-Food Program.
The program, which is an exception to the comprehensive U.N. embargo on Iraq put
in place after the 1991 Persian Gulf war, began operations in December 1996. It was
suspended just before hostilities began, when U.N. staff in Iraq that run the various
aspects of the program departed Iraq. (See CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil-for-Food
Program, Sanctions, and Illicit Trade.)
On March 28, 2003, the U.N. SecurityCouncil unanimouslyadopted Resolution
1472 that restarted the program’s operations and empowered the United Nations, for
a 45-day period (until May 12), to take direct control of all aspects of the program.
Under the new resolution, the United Nations is setting priorities for and directing the
delivery of already contracted supplies. The enhanced U.N. authority was extended
on April 25, 2003, to last at least until the six-month phase of the program expired
on June 3, 2003.
On April 17, 2003, the Administration called for a lifting of U.N. sanctions
against Iraq, signaling that the Administration wanted to focus on restoring normal
international commerce with Iraq rather than extending the oil-for-food program.
Resolution 1483 lifted sanctions and provided for the phasing out of the oil for food
program within six months after adoption of that resolution on May 22; the program
terminated on November 21, 2003. The resolution also provided for the United
Nations to transfer to the new DFI $1 billion in funds held by the oil-for-food
program escrow fund. As of the start of the war, the program’s escrow account had
about $11 billion to fund imports of humanitarian and other goods. Since then, the
program had set priorities for about $8.2 billion in contracts, leaving about $2 billion
in unallocated funds remaining, after subtracting the $1 billion already transferred to
the DFI in May 2003. In anticipation of the surplus funds as the program was about
to terminate, the oil-for-food program transferred $2 billion to the DFI in October
and November 2003.
Some press reports suggest that U.N. officials believed the program should
have been extended in order to facilitate an orderly phase-out of the program. The
United States and Britain opposed another extension and, as of its termination on
November 21, have taken over its functions. On November 24, 2003, the U.N.
SecurityCouncil adopted a resolution to continue its “Sanctions Committee” that has
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monitored the U.N. economic embargo on Iraq since 1990, but to end, subject to later
review, that Committee’s mandate to monitor the U.N. embargo on arms sales to
Iraq. Part of the Committee’s economic sanctions mandate will include ensuring that
assets of the former regime remain frozen. (For more information, see CRS Report
RL30472, Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program, International Sanctions, and Illicit Trade.)
Debt Relief. The Administration is attempting to relieve Iraq’s debt burden
built up during the regime of Saddam Hussein. The debt is estimated to total about
$116 billion, not including reparations dating to the first Persian Gulf war. On
December 5, 2003, President Bush appointed former Secretary of State James Baker
as an envoy to try to persuade other governments to forgive Iraq’s debt. In visits
during December 2003 to countries in Europe and Asia, including France and
Germany, Baker obtained pledges for reduction of a “substantial” portion (widely
interpreted as about two thirds) of Iraq’s estimated $41.5 billion in debt to the “Paris
Club” nations. Of the Paris Club nations, the largest Iraq debt is held by Japan,
Russia, France, Germany, the United States, Italy, and Britain. Approximately $45
billion in Iraqi debt is to Middle Eastern and Persian Gulf countries, and $9 billion
is held by other major countries including China. The remainder of the debt is held
by private creditors. (For more information, see CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraq:
Weapons Programs, U.N. Requirements, and U.S. Policy.)
Searching for Former Regime Violations and Officials
Organs of the CPA and the U.S. government are attempting to uncover evidence
of gross human rights abuses and other violations of the regime of Saddam Hussein,
including evidence of WMD. A 1,500 person “Iraq Survey Group,” headed by a U.S.
military commander (Maj. Gen. Keith Dayton) but composed of many civilian
technical experts led by former U.N. weapons inspector David Kay, is attempting to
uncover alleged WMD. The Survey Group is also searching for mass graves of
victims of the former regime. In early October 2003, Kay released an interim report
on the Survey Group’s WMD investigation. The report said the Group had not found
actual weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, but it had found “dozens of WMD-related
program activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from the
United Nations during the inspections that began in late 2002.”37 The
Administration, according to press reports, has requested an additional $600 million
to fund the Survey Group for another six months, and about $300 million has been
spent on the search as of early October 2003.38 Kay reportedly has told
Administration officials he is leaving before the Survey Group’s work is completed,
possibly by February 2004; the resignation came amid reports that some Survey
Group staff has been diverted from the WMD search to gathering information on
Iraqi insurgents.
Thus far, the Survey Group has found over 500 mass graves, some with
hundreds of corpses. Most appear to contain bodies of Kurdish and Shiite opponents
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of the former regime, but some contain some of the bodies of about 600 Kuwaitis
missing from the first Gulf war. (WMD issues and the fate of the missing Kuwaitis
are discussed in CRS Issue Brief IB92117.)
An issue related to regime change but somewhat separate is the future trial of
Saddam Hussein and his associates on charges of war crimes and crimes against
humanity. In the year prior to the war, the Administration was gathering data for a
potential trial of Saddam and 12 of his associates. Those it had sought for trial
include Saddam; his two sons Uday and Qusay (killed after discovery by and a
firefight with U.S. forces in Mosul on July 22, 2003); Ali Hassan al-Majid, for
alleged use of chemicals against the Kurds (captured August 21, 2003); Muhammad
Hamza al-Zubaydi (surrendered in mid-April 2003); Taha Yasin Ramadan; first Vice
President and number three in the regime (captured August 19, 2003); Izzat Ibrahim,
Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council and formally number two
in the regime; Barzan al-Tikriti, Saddam’s half brother (captured in mid-April 2003);
Watban al-Tikriti (captured in April 2003) and Sabawi al-Tikriti, both other half
brothers of Saddam and former leaders of regime intelligence bureaus; Tariq Aziz,
deputy Prime Minister and foremost regime spokesman (surrendered in May 2003);
and Aziz Salih Noman, governor of Kuwait during Iraq’s occupation of that country
(captured May 2003).
According to Iraqi political leaders, an Iraqi-run tribunal could begin
proceedings against former president Saddam Hussein on charges of genocide and
crimes against humanity in the spring of 2004. Possible charges against Hussein
include the use of chemical weapons against ethnic Kurds in 1988, the execution of
prominent Shiite Muslim clerics, and the killing of hundreds of Sunni Muslim
tribesmen after a coup attempt.
Others not on the list of twelve, but part of a list of 55 former regime officials
sought by the United States for questioning and possible arrest, have been captured
or surrendered. As of late September 2003, 43 of the Iraqis on the list of 55 are now
in custody or were killed. Others not on the list of 55 have been apprehended as
well: Amir al-Saadi, chief science adviser to Saddam; Jamal Mustafa al-Tikriti, a
son-in-law of Saddam; Vice President Taha Muhi ad-Din Ma’ruf; and suspected
WMD manager Hoda Mahdi Salih al-Ammash.
The war crimes issue has been addressed by previous U.S. administrations and
the international community. U.N. Security Council Resolution 674 (October 29,
1990) calls on all states or organizations to provide information on Iraq’s war-related
atrocities to the United Nations. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for
FY1992 (P.L. 102-138, October 28, 1991, Section 301) stated the sense of Congress
that the President should propose to the U.N. Security Council a war crimes tribunal
for Saddam Hussein. Similar legislation was later passed, including H.Con.Res. 137
(passed the House November 13, 1997); S.Con.Res. 78 (passed the Senate March
13, 1998); and a provision of the Iraq Liberation Act (P.L. 105-338, signed October
31, 1998).
A U.S. Army report on possible war crimes was released on March 19, 1993,
after Clinton took office. Since April 1997, the United States has supported
INDICT, a private organization that publicizes alleged Iraqi war crimes and seeks the
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arrest of the 12 alleged Iraqi war criminals mentioned above. In August 2000, the
Clinton Administration’s Ambassador-At-Large for War Crimes, David Scheffer,
said that the United States wanted to see an Iraq war crimes tribunal established,
focusing on “nine major criminal episodes.” These included the use of chemical
weapons against Kurdish civilians at Halabja (March 16, 1988, killing 5,000 Kurds)
and the forced relocation of Kurds in the “Anfal” campaign (February 1988, in which
an estimated 50,000 to 182,000 Kurds died); the use of chemical weapons against
Iran; post-war crimes against humanity (the Kurds and the Marsh Arabs); war crimes
against Kuwait (including oil field fires) and coalition forces; and other allegations.
In FY2001 and again in FY2002, the State Department contributed $4 million to a
U.N. “Iraq War Crimes Commission,” to be spent if a U.N. tribunal for Iraq war
crimes is formed.
The FY2004 supplemental request contains a request for funding of a “Truth
and Reconciliation Commission,” and the establishment of a human rights
commission. The requests also asks for funding for further investigations into the
human rights abuses committed by the former regime, as well as some memorials to
the victims of those abuses. In the FY2004 supplemental request, about $25 million
is requested for these and related activities, such as women and youth civic education
programs.
Congressional Reactions
Congress, like the Administration, had divergent views on the mechanisms for
promoting regime change, although there was widespread agreement in Congress that
regime change was desirable and an appropriate U.S. policy. There was substantial
disagreement over whether a major military offensive was the most desirable option
for achieving that objective. On December 20, 2001, the House passed H.J.Res. 75,
by a vote of 392-12, calling Iraq’s refusal to readmit U.N. weapons inspectors a
“mounting threat” to the United States. The resolution did not call for new U.S. steps
to overthrow Saddam Hussein but a few Members called for the overthrow of
Saddam Hussein in their floor statements in support of the resolution.
In early 2002, prior to the intensified speculation about possible war with Iraq,
some Members expressed support for increased aid to the opposition. In a joint
appearance with Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joseph Biden on
Cable News Network on February 17, 2002, House International Relations
Committee Chairman Henry Hyde said that “...supporting the underground, the
opposition, the internal opposition, is to me the procedure of choice. That is an
option that is being worked on. All of these options are under consideration.” In
early December 2001, a bipartisan group of nine Members — Senators John
McCain, Jesse Helms, Richard Shelby, Sam Brownback, Joseph Lieberman, and
Trent Lott and Representatives Henry Hyde, Benjamin Gilman, and Harold Ford Jr.
— wrote to President Bush to urge that U.S. assistance be provided to the INC for
operations inside Iraq itself. According to the letter,
Despite the express wishes of the Congress, the INC has been denied U.S.
assistance for any operations inside any part of Iraq, including liberated Kurdish
areas. Instead, successive Administrations have funded conferences, offices and
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other intellectual exercises that have done little more than expose the INC to
accusations of being “limousine insurgents” and “armchair guerrillas.”
As discussion of potential military action increased in the fall of 2002,
Members debated the costs and risks of an all-out U.S. effort to achieve that result.
Congress adopted H.J.Res. 114, authorizing the President to use military force
against Iraq if he determines that doing so is in the national interest and will enforce
U.N. Security Council resolutions on Iraq. The measure passed the House on
October 11, 2002 by a vote of 296-133, and the Senate the following day by a vote
of 77-23. The legislation was signed into law on October 16, 2002 (P.L. 107-243).
The 108th Congress was sworn in on January 7, 2003. Prior to the war, it held
several hearings on the progress of post-war reconstruction. During the war and in
its aftermath, several Members applauded the performance of the U.S. military and
the overthrow of the regime. Some Members, however, have criticized the
Administration for inadequate planning for the post-war period in light of major
looting and disorder in Iraq’s cities after the fall of the regime. Criticism of post-war
planning has escalated as attacks on U.S. occupation forces have mounted, although
the Administration and others say U.S. casualties are relatively light and that the
resistance is not jeopardizing overall U.S. objectives for Iraq. Several Committees
are conducting inquiries into why substantial amounts of WMD have not been found
in Iraq to date. Some Members of both parties have also expressed concern about the
costs of the U.S. occupation, particularly in light of the Administration’s September
2003 request for an additional $87 billion in funding, and several Members have
called on the Administration to take greater steps to persuade other countries to share
the burden of peacekeeping in and reconstruction of Iraq. Others have called for an
increase in the number of U.S. troops in Iraq or re-evaluation of the mix of U.S.
forces to ensure that the skill set of the U.S. force matches the needs of
reconstruction. Some Members who have visited Iraq in recent months — and a
reported one third of Members have visited Iraq since the fall of Saddam — say
reconstruction is proceeding well and that Iraq is more stable than that portrayed in
the press.39
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Appendix. U.S. Assistance to the Opposition
Appropriated Economic Support Funds (E.S.F.)
to the Opposition













































Notes: The figures above do not include defense articles and services provided under the Iraq
Liberation Act. During FY1999-FY2000, approximately $5 million worth of services, out of the $97
million authorized by the Act, was obligated to the opposition, and $1 million of that has been spent,
as of late December 2002. The figures provided above also do not include any covert aid provided,
the amounts of which are not known from open sources. In addition, during each of FY2001 and
FY2002, the Administration has donated $4 million to a “U.N. War Crimes Commission” fund, to be
used if a war crimes tribunal is formed. Those funds were drawn from U.S. contributions to U.N.
programs. ESF transfers to the INC for its operations continued until August 2003.
